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INTRODUCTION
“We are interested in protecting the work of art for public
reasons, and the moral right of the artist is in part a method of
providing for private enforcement of this public interest.”1

In 1990, the Copyright Act was amended to name visual
artists, alone among protected authors, possessors of “moral
rights,”2 a set of non-economic intellectual property rights
originating in nineteenth-century Europe. Although enhancing
authors’ rights in a user-oriented system was a novel
undertaking,3 it was rendered further anomalous by the statute’s
designated class, given copyright’s longstanding alliance with
text.4 And although moral rights epitomize the legacy of the
Romantic author as a cultural trope embedded in the law,
American culture offered little to support or explain the apparent
privileging of visual artists over other authors.5 What, if not a

1

John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J.
1023, 1041 (1976).
2
See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 § 603 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A
(2006)).
3
The presence or absence of moral rights in copyright law has historically
marked the divide between author-oriented civil law countries and user-oriented
common law countries, but that line has blurred in recent years with common law
countries increasingly adopting a version of moral rights. See, e.g., Copyright Act
1968 (Cth) pt 9 (Austl.); Copyright Act 1994, pt 4 (N.Z.); Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 77–89 (U.K.).
4
See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125
HARV. L. REV. 683, 685 (2012) (noting that the words, “the prototypical subject
matter of copyright,” have dominated the law’s development).
5
See Charlotte Burns, “Artists Are Seen as One Step Above Criminals”, ART
NEWSPAPER, Oct. 1, 2011, http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Artists-are-
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legal or cultural disposition toward visual artists, precipitated
the enactment of a moral rights statute like the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”)? This Article demonstrates that the
answer is less related to authorship concerns than would
reasonably be surmised from a doctrine premised on the theory
that a creative work embodies the author’s honor, personhood,
and even soul.6
The question, and its revealing answer, has been obscured by
the more obvious issue of VARA’s ineffectiveness. VARA, an
emphatically contained statute,7 has generated a remarkably
disproportionate degree of scholarly interest, most of which
reflects a desire to expand its reach and scope.8 However,
commentators usually discuss VARA’s limitations within the
confines of serving visual artists and works of art, not other types

seen-as-one-step-above-ciminals/24654 (quoting artist Paul McCarthy in title, who
was referring to American culture); Carol Becker, The Artist as Public Intellectual,
in THE POLITICS OF CULTURE: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR INDIVIDUALS,
INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNITIES 236, 239 (Gigi Bradford et al. eds., 2000)
(discussing societal mistrust of artists and stereotype as “somewhat irresponsible,
less than adult”).
6
The term “moral right” resulted from a direct translation of the French term
droit moral; however, the rights are more accurately described as authorial rights of
personality, as in the German term urheberpersonlichkeitsrecht. Stephen R. Munzer
& Kal Raustiala, The Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional
Knowledge, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37, 68 (2009).
7
See ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A
MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 47 (2010) (describing U.S. system as
more minimalistic than either civil or common law regimes).
8
The sheer number of VARA articles is often remarked upon. See, e.g., Susan P.
Liemer, How We Lost Our Moral Rights and the Door Closed on Non-Economic
Values in Copyright, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 6 n.39 (2005)
(contrasting artists’ lack of success in court with amount of VARA scholarship
generated); Christopher J. Robinson, Note, The “Recognized Stature” Standard in
the Visual Artists Rights Act, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1935, 1939 n.22 (2000) (“Moral
rights, not surprisingly, are a favorite of academics, and articles on the subject far
outnumber the cases in which moral rights are invoked.”); Law Students Crazy Over
Visual Artists Rights Act, CLANCCO (June 1, 2010, 5:29 PM), http://clancco.com/wp/
2010/06/law-students-crazy-over-visual-artists-rights-act.
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of authors.9 In other words, the moral rights doctrine in the
United States is typically perceived as a branch of “artists’
rights.”10
This Article argues that VARA did not merely allocate moral
rights to a circumscribed group of authors, but repurposed them.
VARA’s conceptual underpinnings, while glossed with Romantic
rhetoric, were primarily informed by a different subject, the
unique art object. Thus, to argue that VARA does not adequately
protect artists overlooks its more basic purpose: a “method”—to
borrow from the quote above—of serving the presumed public
interest in art preservation.
VARA was conceptualized foremost as a statute honoring
unique, valuable objects of art; the artist was secondary. This
inverted balance of the very connection between creator and
created that traditional moral rights law enshrines, however
slight, has powerfully shaped the law’s doctrinal landscape in the
United States. Although VARA assumes the Romantic author as
a vital premise, it ultimately regulates objects—the consumption
of art rather than its production—acting as a tiny virtual
museum whose hermetic confines are always in tension with the
sweep of its ascribed cultural role. Despite the voluminous

9

See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Moral Rights: Diagnosis and Rehabilitation, 46 AM.
BUS. L.J. 407, 408 (2009) (“Scholarly research has lamented the weakness of U.S.
protection for artists . . . .”); Peter H. Karlen, What’s Wrong with VARA: A Critique of
Federal Moral Rights, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 905, 906 (1993); Burton Ong,
Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of Integrity Rights, 26
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 297, 298 n.5, 303 (2003); Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic
Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A Comparison of Droit Moral Between France
and the United States, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 361, 364 (1998); Jill R.
Applebaum, Comment, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: An Analysis Based on
the French Droit Moral, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 183, 210–12 (1992); Robert J.
Sherman, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American Artists Burned
Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 376–78 (1995). One prominent exception appears in
Professor Kwall’s proposal for moral rights reform that would encompass a broad
class of creative authors. See, e.g., KWALL, supra note 7, at 149.
10
See Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists’ Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 41, 42–43 (1998) (defining moral rights as reflecting the “unique
relationship between an artist, the creative process, and the resultant art”). Even
critics of the doctrine tend to focus on its implications for artists. See, e.g., Amy M.
Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 265 (2009); Lindsey A. Mills,
Note, Moral Rights: Well-Intentioned Protection and Its Unintended Consequences,
90 TEX. L. REV. 443, 444 (2011).
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corpus of scholarship critiquing VARA, the specific cultural
fissures prompted by its system of realizing moral rights through
art preservation remain unaddressed.11
Recently, Amy Adler attacked VARA’s premises from the
vantage of postmodern “anti-art” theory, positioning the
Romantic author and art itself as historical anachronisms.12
While this Article acknowledges anti-art conceptual tendencies
as a crucial component of VARA’s cultural misalignment, the
analysis here uses a broader epistemology to accommodate a
diverse field of expression where no single theory dominates, and
in which the author is not as yet dead. However, neither does
this Article expand upon the deeply internal process of human
creativity charted by Roberta Rosenthal Kwall.13 Instead, this
Article offers a sociocultural perspective of the moral rights
doctrine as it developed in the United States, positioning VARA
as both a culmination of particular values and a constitutive
force in perpetuating them. Although this Article is not the first
to notice that VARA’s emphasis falls on the object rather than
the artist, the assumptions embedded in this priority and VARA’s
resulting social ruptures as arts policy, as moral rights doctrine,
and as copyright law have not been documented.
Part I offers an overview of traditional moral rights theory,
particularly the right of integrity, and outlines relevant strains of
law and culture that preceded the enactment of VARA. Part II
discusses how VARA functions as a statute that mediates artists’
rights through the physical object, and how the deliberate
synthesis of preservation theory with orthodox moral rights
philosophy hamstrings both ends. Part III identifies cultural
assumptions embedded in three prominent attributes of the art
object conceptualized as protected under VARA—material,
cultural, and transcendent—and discusses their conflicting
impulses in the law. Finally, Part IV concludes that the “object
model,” infused with deterministic theories of modernism and
11

That the statute’s problems cannot be traced exclusively to its narrow scope is
suggested by its complicated interaction with the art world. See, e.g., Virginia
Rutledge, Institutional Critique: Virginia Rutledge on Christoph Büchel and Mass
MoCA, ARTFORUM, Mar. 1, 2008, at 151, 382 (pointing out, with respect to a case in
which an artist and art museum were adversaries, that the issues were less about
VARA’s scope than the values it reflects).
12
See Adler, supra note 10, at 265, 285.
13
E.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic
Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1947–48 (2006).
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cultural evolution, must be dismantled for moral rights to
assume a viable and meaningful role in copyright law. Through
this discussion, this Article offers a discursive platform for
redirecting the predicate theory of the moral rights doctrine
toward a contemporary construct of authorial dignity.
I.

MORAL RIGHTS BACKGROUND

This section contrasts moral rights theory in its original
European incarnation, a function of philosophical ideas about
personhood, with its doctrinal topography in the United States,
explicitly rationalized with societal goals.
Selected social,
political, and art historical developments in twentieth-century
America are identified to contextualize VARA’s enactment.
A.

Moral Rights Orthodoxy

Although there is no universal system of moral rights law,14
the nineteenth-century French droit moral established the
dominant conceptual paradigm,15 influenced by the philosophies
of Kant and Hegel, that a creative work is not simply an external
object but the communication of an author’s thoughts, imbued
with his personality.16 Under this construct, moral rights are
non-economic, inalienable rights that transcend the economic
formalities of sale. They protect the artist who “projects into the
world part of his personality and subjects it to the ravages of
public use.”17

14
See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and
the Common Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 229, 230 (1995) (noting a
lack of consensus among civil law jurisdictions).
15
See ELIZABETH ADENEY, THE MORAL RIGHTS OF AUTHORS AND PERFORMERS:
AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ¶¶ 1.63–1.64 (2006) (discussing
evolution in France through court decisions in mid-nineteenth century). Some argue
that the distinction between civil and common law countries is more conceptual than
practical. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The Conceptual Transformation of Moral Rights, 55
AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 72–73 (2007). Contra Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and
the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright
Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 17 (1994).
16
Netanel, supra note 15. Hegel is generally credited with originating the
philosophy underlying the “dualist” French system, where copyright law protects an
author’s economic rights and the droit moral protects the personal rights arising
from the author’s projection of self into the work. Id. at 19–21, 23.
17
Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists,
Authors, and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940).
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The moral right of integrity,18 the central focus of this
Article, requires the purchaser to respect the work in its original,
authentic form. John Merryman illustrated this right in his
seminal article that, importantly, used visual art as the primary
vehicle for explaining moral rights.19 In the French case he
described, the owner of a painted refrigerator with six panels
attempted to sell one panel as if it were a complete work by artist
Bernard Buffet. Buffet brought an action to prevent the separate
sale of the panel and succeeded.20 As explained by Merryman,
“Distortion, dismemberment or misrepresentation of the work
mistreats an expression of the artist’s personality, [and] affects
his artistic identity, personality, and honor.”21
The purpose of the right of integrity is anchored in the
artist’s personality. Thus, civil law countries historically have
not included a right to prohibit the complete destruction of an art
work on the theory that unlike misrepresentation, mere absence
cannot harm an artist’s reputation.22 Further, although moral
rights are perpetual in France, the rights remain personal to the
artist; heirs are presumed to inherit only a right of

18
The four basic rights typically embraced within the doctrine include: (1) the
right of disclosure; (2) the right to withdraw; (3) the right of attribution (to have
one’s name or authorship recognized); and (4) the right of integrity of the work of
art. See, e.g., Adolf Dietz, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil
Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199, 203 (1995); Raymond Sarraute,
Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM.
J. COMP. L. 465, 467 (1968).
19
Merryman, supra note 1, at 1027.
20
Id. at 1023 n.1 (discussing Buffet v. Fersing, Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court
of appeal] Paris, 1962, D. Jur. 570, 571 (Fr.)).
21
Id. at 1027.
22
See KWALL, supra note 7, at 44; Roeder, supra note 17, at 569 (observing that
“even in France,” there was precedent declining to prohibit destruction as a moral
right); Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 110 (1997); Cyrill
P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 371 (2006);
Marina Santilli, United States’ Moral Rights Developments in European Perspective,
1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 89, 100 (1997) (noting right to prevent destruction
“remains quite controversial in Europe”). But see Edward J. Damich, The New York
Artists’ Authorship Rights Act: A Comparative Critique, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1733,
1742 (1984) (stating that the French right of integrity includes prohibition of
complete destruction).
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enforcement.23 Some jurisdictions, such as Germany, refuse to
recognize a perpetual right of integrity because doing so would
convert the right into an instrument of cultural preservation.24
B.

Early Conceptions of Moral Rights, American Style

For many years, the United States resisted joining the
international copyright treaty known as the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne”),
founded in 1886, at least partially due to its moral rights
provisions.25 Although the American response to Berne has a
complex history,26 one prominent feature was unwavering
opposition by the motion picture industry and broadcasters due
to the adaptation needs found crucial in these industries.27
Lawmakers considered moral rights incompatible with the classic
social utility model of copyright law and the corresponding
principle of unlimited alienability.28

23

Dietz, supra note 18, at 214.
Rigamonti, supra note 22, at 370–71.
25
E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 7 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,
6917 (“[C]onsensus over United States adherence [to the Berne Convention] was
slow to develop in large part because of debate over the requirements of Article
6bis.”); see also Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting
that protecting moral rights was a “prominent hurdle” in the debate over joining
Berne). Article 6bis, the moral rights provision, currently reads:
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer
of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the
work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or
other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
art. 6bis, 828 U.N.T.S. 223, 235 (amended Sept. 28, 1979).
26
See H.R. 5853, 73d Cong. (1933); S. 3047, 74th Cong. (1935) (“Duffy Bill”);
H.R. 10632, 74th Cong. (1936) (“Daly Bill”). See generally Willy Hoffman, European
Legislation and Judicial Decision in the Field of Copyright in 1930, 8 N.Y.U. L. Q.
REV. 369, 369–84 (1931) (discussing the “Vestal Bill”); Barbara A. Ringer, The Role
of the United States in International Copyright—Past, Present, and Future, 56 GEO.
L.J. 1050, 1059 (1968) (noting that United States declined a limited-time offer to
adhere to 1908 Berlin text); Steven Wilf, The Making of the Post-War Paradigm in
American Intellectual Property Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 139, 178–82 (2008).
27
See, e.g., International Convention of the Copyright Union: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 75th Cong. 20 (1937)
(statement of Edwin P. Kilroe, Chairman, Copyright Comm., Motion Picture
Producers and Distributors of America).
28
Netanel, supra note 15, at 9–13.
24
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This country’s first explicit judicial invocation of the moral
right of integrity in 194929 involved the wholesale destruction of
art—a large fresco mural in a church that had been painted over
at the insistence of the parishioners.30 A New York court rejected
the artist’s moral rights argument,31 but referenced two salient
writings in its opinion, both of which addressed destruction.32
The first, a law journal article, described the personality-driven
understanding of the integrity right that includes a right to
prevent distortion, but not destruction: “To deform [the artist’s]
work is to present him to the public as the creator of a work not
his own, and thus make him subject to criticism for work he has
not done; the destruction of his work does not have this result.”33
The other, a landmark treatise on international copyright
law by Stephen Ladas, asserted that moral rights should be
extended to authors for the destruction of art work because,
“[t]he maintenance and preservation of a work of art is invested
with the public interest in culture and the development of the
arts.”34
Both writers contemplated cultural heritage as a strong
rationale for adopting moral rights and thus viewed them as
perpetual.35 Subsequent academic writings on moral rights
continued this entanglement of a public interest in preserving
culture and the author’s rights of personhood.36 Although
29
The right of attribution was first referenced slightly earlier. See Vargas v.
Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 523–27 (7th Cir. 1947).
30
Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church in N.Y., 194 Misc. 570, 571–72, 89
N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1949). In 1938, Alfred Crimi was selected to
execute a large fresco mural painting inside a church in Manhattan. Eight years
later, the mural was painted over because parishioners objected to his depiction of a
bare-chested Christ, claiming that it placed more emphasis on physical attributes
than spiritual qualities. Id. at 570–72, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 814–15.
31
Id. at 574, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 817 (noting that the United States was not a
signatory to Berne).
32
See Roeder, supra note 17, at 569. See generally STEPHEN P. LADAS, 1 THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY (1938).
33
Roeder, supra note 17, at 569.
34
LADAS, supra note 32, § 287.
35
Roeder merely saw the public interest as vesting at the artist’s death, but not
before. See Roeder, supra note 17, at 574–75 (“The real reason . . . for protection of
the moral right after the creator’s death lies in the need of society for protection of
the integrity of its cultural heritage.”). Ladas saw moral rights as a basis for serving
the public interest both during and after the artist’s lifetime. LADAS, supra note 32,
§§ 275, 286.
36
See Sidney A. Diamond, Legal Protection for the “Moral Rights” of Authors
and Other Creators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 244, 258 (1978) (“[T]he destruction of a
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America was not unique in this conflation, it marks a doctrinal
shift from the natural rights underpinnings of the droit moral to
social policy.37
C.

Historical Context

At the risk of oversimplifying, this section presents some
selected background in twentieth-century art and cultural norms
to situate VARA historically.
1.

High Culture and Cultural Policy

The “culture” or “cultural heritage” referenced by the above
legal scholars was synonymous with the arts, or “high culture.”38
Not unrelatedly, the perceived American identity vis-à-vis the
fine arts was one of inferiority to Continental Europe, a
sentiment that only began to change post-World War II.39
American artists assumed their first prominent international
role in these years when the Western art world was dislocated
from Paris to New York by the Abstract Expressionists, the heirs
apparent to European modernism.40 The United States formally
entered the Western canon with their highly abstract, massive
canvases. The associated critical approach to modern art became
formalism, an aesthetic theory that in its most extreme form

work without the author’s consent removes something from the cultural heritage of
society.”); Arthur L. Stevenson, Jr., Moral Right and the Common Law: A Proposal,
6 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 89, 92 (1955) (in addition to protecting personality,
the moral right “seeks to preserve the cultural heritage of the nation.”); Mary A. Lee,
Comment, Moral Rights Doctrine: Protection of the Artist’s Interest in His Creation
After Sale, 2 ALA. L. REV. 267, 272 (1950) (“The public’s interest in the preservation
of literature, music, drama, and art is a strong argument for adopting the doctrine
[of moral rights].”).
37
See ADENEY, supra note 15, at ¶¶ 3.01–3.53.
38
This sentiment may be divined from the pre-war understanding of the term
“culture,” as well as the writers’ comparative vantages, looking to Western Europe.
See, e.g., Roeder, supra note 17 (“Busy with the economic exploitation of her vast
natural wealth, America has, perhaps, neglected the arts . . . .”).
39
See, e.g., John Kreidler, Leverage Lost: Evolution in the Nonprofit Arts
Ecosystem, in THE POLITICS OF CULTURE: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR INDIVIDUALS,
INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNITIES, supra note 5, at 147, 147–50 (“America had a
hefty cultural inferiority complex by the late 1950s, by no means a new phenomenon
in the nation’s history.”).
40
See generally DIANE CRANE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AVANT-GARDE:
THE NEW YORK ART WORLD, 1940–1985 (1987).
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renounced content beyond the self-referential material of the
picture plane, a teleological narrative crafted by the
extraordinarily influential art critic Clement Greenberg.41
The Abstract Expressionists were branded with a distinct
cultural mythology and American ideology—heroism and
individual liberty—that coincided with America’s new wealth and
power. For the first time, government deliberately aligned itself
with the arts, and did so publicly;42 it actively promoted Abstract
Expressionism abroad, absorbing these artists into Cold War,
anti-Communist rhetoric.43 Until that point, the government’s
principal foray into the arts had been the Federal Art Project, a
Depression-era program motivated more by economic recovery
than support for the arts.44 The new theme of triumphant
individualism likewise departed from the collectivist orientation
of the 1930s project.45
By the early 1960s, amid America’s enhanced consumption
and abundance, the fine arts became perceived as a scarce
resource threatened by increasingly pervasive forms of mass

41
See, e.g., Jonathan Harris, Modernism and Culture in the USA, 1930–1960, in
MODERNISM IN DISPUTE: ART SINCE THE FORTIES 2, 42–65 (1994) [hereinafter
MODERNISM IN DISPUTE].
42
John D. Rockefeller III testified in Congress that democratic government and
the arts are “in league with one another, for they both center on the individual and
the fullest development of his capacities and talents.” Margaret J. Wyszomirski,
Raison d’Etat, Raisons des Arts: Thinking About Public Purposes, in THE PUBLIC
LIFE OF THE ARTS IN AMERICA 50, 50 (Joni M. Cherbo & Margaret J. Wyszomirski
eds., 2000) (quoting John D. Rockefeller III before the U.S. Subcommittee on
Education, Arts & Humanities on October 31, 1963 on behalf of Joint Resolution 104
to establish a National Council on the Arts and National Arts Foundation).
43
See Harris, supra note 41, at 37, 40. See generally SERGE GUILBAUT, HOW
NEW YORK STOLE THE IDEA OF MODERN ART: ABSTRACT EXPRESSIONISM, FREEDOM,
AND THE COLD WAR (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2008).
44
The Federal Art Project (1935–1943) was established as one of many welfare
programs under the Works Progress Administration. See Lawrence D. Mankin,
Federal Arts Patronage in the New Deal, in AMERICA’S COMMITMENT TO CULTURE:
GOVERNMENT AND THE ARTS 77, 77–91 (Kevin V. Mulcahy & Margaret Jane
Wyszomirski eds., 1995); Emily Genauer, New Horizons in American Art,
PARNASSUS, Oct. 1936, at 3, 3–7.
45
The Federal Art Project “ ‘proceeded on the principle that it is not the solitary
genius but a sound general movement which maintains art as a vital, functioning
part of any cultural scene.’ ” Genauer, supra note 44, at 3 (quoting Holger Cahill,
national director of the Federal Art Project). Cahill had also justified the Project in
contravention of European traditions and modernism, stating, “[i]f [the taste of the
American people] was not always of the best, it was an honest taste, a genuine
reflection of community interests and of community experience.” Harris, supra note
41, at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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culture.46 The “scarce resource” ideology was vividly expressed in
the Kennedy era, when the federal government aggressively
forged high-art policy initiatives, as realized in the 1965
Congressional legislation that created the National Endowments
for the Arts and Humanities.47 But the alliance of government
and art had begun to unravel even as it formed. After the 1960s,
U.S. cultural policy became defined by a “policy of no policy,”
rationalized as cultural pluralism, with support for the arts
primarily shouldered by individual donors and charitable
organizations, incentivized through tax exemptions.48
2.

The Post-War Art Market

The “art world” today is a quasi-autonomous global market,
associated with the wealthiest sector of society. Thomas Crow
traces the contemporary roots of its high-end extravagance to
marketing efforts by gallery owners Leo Castelli and Ileana
Sonnabend in the 1950s and 60s.49 Castelli galvanized a
successful national market for works by American artists, and he
exported this model abroad, relying on the highly recognizable
imagery of Pop art.50 America had its first art boom in this new
vernacular,51 but Pop’s blurring of the distinction between high
art and mass culture also helped trigger the breakdown of
Greenberg’s trajectory of modernism.

46
See, e.g., Glenn Wallach, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF CULTURE, supra
note 5, at 1, 2–3; see also Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Notes on a National Cultural
Policy, DAEDALUS, Spring 1960, at 394, 399 (“As the problems of our affluent society
become more qualitative and less quantitative, we must expect culture to emerge as
a matter of national concern and to respond to a national purpose.”).
47
Wallach, supra note 46, at 3; see also Holland Cotter, The Boom Is Over. Long
Live the Art!, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at AR1 (remarking that NEA was
established “so Americans wouldn’t keep looking, in the words of Arthur Schlesinger
Jr., like ‘money-grubbing materialists’ ”).
48
See, e.g., Kevin V. Mulcahy, The Government and Cultural Patronage: A
Comparative Analysis of Cultural Patronage in the United States, France, Norway,
and Canada, in THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THE ARTS IN AMERICA, supra note 42, at 138,
145 (describing system as “the distinguishing characteristic of the American cultural
condition”).
49
Thomas Crow, Art and Its Markets: Historical Returns, ARTFORUM, Apr. 1,
2008, at 286, 288.
50
Id. For characteristic examples of Pop art, see works of Claus Oldenburg, Roy
Lichtenstein, James Rosenquist, and Andy Warhol.
51
See CRANE, supra note 40, at 35–41.
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With a proliferation of artistic styles and an increased
audience, the art world infrastructure in the United States
underwent considerable expansion into the 1970s,52 buttressed by
extrinsic financial support from corporations53 and government;54
fine art extended its social and professional reach through its
incorporation into the American education system.55 The decade
that preceded the enactment of VARA was glitzy, as witnessed in
the highly publicized and now iconic auction sale of Van Gogh’s
Irises for nearly $54 million in 1987,56 while “neo-expressionist”
painters attained levels of publicity formerly associated with the
entertainment industry.
Even during these expansive years, however, making a living
as a professional artist was not necessarily viable. Artists in the
United States have historically continued their pursuit by
supplementing income with non-artistic jobs, under the general
theory that they are “doing what they love.”57 Indeed, because of
52

As summarized by one author:
Museums added space and activities devoted to modern art; galleries
handling modern art increased from 20 to 300; from a dozen or so, the
number of serious modern art collectors grew to thousands; exhibitions by
painters increased by 50 percent; according to some estimates, the number
of people calling themselves artists grew from 600,000 in 1970 to over a
million by 1980. . . .
VERA L. ZOLBERG, CONSTRUCTING A SOCIOLOGY OF THE ARTS 63 (1990). Between
1970 and 1990, the number of artists (i.e., including musicians, writers, dancers,
etc.) doubled in the United States, growing at twice the rate of the overall labor
force. NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, ARTISTS IN THE WORKFORCE 1990–2005 1
(2008), available at www.arts.gov/research/artistsinworkforce.pdf; see also Jonathan
M. Rotter, Law, Economics, Technology, and the Social Construction of Art, 37 J.
ARTS MGMT. L. & SOC’Y 281, 283 (2008) (citing similar statistic).
53
See CRANE, supra note 40, at 5–8.
54
To place government support in perspective, the NEA budget rose from $2.9
million in 1966 to approximately $165 million in 1987. Its 2011 budget was
approximately $155 million. National Endowment for the Arts Appropriations
History, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, http://www.arts.gov/about/Budget/
AppropriationsHistory.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
55
CRANE, supra note 40, at 8–11 (stating that the number of Masters of Fine
Arts degrees awarded by American schools increased from 525 in 1950 to 8,708 in
1980).
56
Three years later, Van Gogh’s Portrait of Dr. Gachet would sell for $82.5
million to Japanese businessman Ryoei Saito. Steven R. Weisman, One Man, Two
Masterpieces and Many Questions in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1990, at 1; see also
JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT 7 (1999) (discussing Saito’s
“joke” announcement that he would have the work cremated with him).
57
According to census data, artists are twice as likely as others in the U.S. labor
force to have earned a college degree, yet earn relatively less compensation for their
education level. NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, supra note 52.
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the growth in number of artists, competition for representation in
galleries and museums intensified, leaving only a fraction to
benefit from the enhanced market.58 And even among the
commercially successful, some artists complained of the inequity
in resale profits that inured only to the benefit of the new class of
investor-collectors.59 The concept of “artists’ rights” and “art law”
emerged in this era, with the market booming but scant
protection for artists.60
3.

Cultural Property and Art

Around the time that the United States began carving a
niche in the production and marketing of high culture, a much
broader conception of culture and “cultural property” was
developing in a distinct international convergence of government
policies and cultures. Concerns over the deliberate targeting of
cultural property by the Nazis resulted in the 1954 Hague
Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property.61 Subsequent
deliberation on cultural property assumed a nationalistic
orientation, reflected in the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.62 UNESCO’s

58

CRANE, supra note 40, at 136.
One famous example is Robert Rauschenberg’s confrontation with collector
Robert C. Scull. In an auction held at Sotheby Park Bernet in 1973, Scull sold
Rauschenberg’s combine-painting, Thaw, for $85,000 (purchased by Scull for $900 in
1958) and Double Feature for $90,000 (purchased for $2300). Rauschenberg
reportedly said to Scull, “I’ve been working my ass off for you to make all this profit,”
and shoved him. See Mark L. Favermann, Artists’ Rights in the U.S.A.: Current
Action, LEONARDO, Spring 1978, at 120, 120.
60
Id. at 120–21 (discussing legislation reflecting awareness of “the increasing
importance of the role of artists in contemporary society and of their punitive
treatment in the worlds of commerce and government”); James J. Fishman, The
Emergence of Art Law, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 481, 482 (1977) (“The major factor in the
development of art law has been the art explosion and cultural boom of the past
twenty years.”).
61
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215, 240 (asserting in preamble that “each
people makes its contribution to the culture of the world”).
62
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S.
231, 232; see also Naomi Mezey, The Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 2004, 2009–12 (2007) (discussing the evolution of cultural property law and
UNESCO’s departure from the universalist view of world culture to nationalistic
orientation).
59
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main concern, however, was the culture of indigenous
populations, antiquities, and sites of historic interest; the arts
were only one part.63
In contrast to the exaltation of individualism in the
American embrace of Abstract Expressionism, cultural property
theory values collective production and collective meaning.64 And
unlike in the domain of intellectual property, here the United
States remains a “market nation”—an importer from “source
nations” rather than an exporter.65 Yet the Western fine art
system has a prominent point of conceptual overlap with the
academic and economic valuation of antiquities or artifacts from
poorer nations: the authentic, tangible object. Both types of
objects have high symbolic and often nationalistic value, and
their preservation is deemed a public benefit, especially in
museums, which imply a degree of public access. These objects
are often grouped under the same academic rubric of art history
and may share the auspices of the same museum, even though
cultural property consists of objects not necessarily considered
“art” in their original context and purpose.
D. The Entanglement of Preservation and Moral Rights
Not without coincidence, the most influential of early moral
rights enthusiasts, John Merryman, likewise assumed a
prominent role in theorizing cultural property law, and his
reverence for the physical object is unequivocal.66 For Merryman,
63
See Wallach, supra note 46, at 1–10. For attempts to define cultural property,
see Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural
Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 569–70 (1995) (“[T]hose objects
that are the product of a particular group or community and embody some
expression of that group's identity, regardless of whether the object has achieved
some universal recognition of its value beyond that group.”); Joseph L. Sax, Heritage
Preservation as a Public Duty: The Abbé Grégoire and the Origins of an Idea, 88
MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1142 (1990) (stating that the terms “heritage” and “cultural
property” have no specific meaning and may include “human artifacts as well as
natural objects or places”).
64
See Mezey, supra note 62, at 2010–11 (arguing that both universalist and
nationalist approaches to cultural property implicate groups).
65
Benjamin Folkinshteyn, National Treasure: Implicit Protections of Cultural
Property in the United States, 37 J. ARTS MGMT. L. & SOC’Y 143, 144 (2007); Mezey,
supra note 62, at 2010–11.
66
See, e.g., John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77
CALIF. L. REV. 339, 355 (1989) [hereinafter Merryman, The Public Interest] (“The
essential ingredient of any cultural property policy is that the object itself be
physically preserved.”).
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the interests of artists and the public always intersect at
preservation.
For this reason, moral rights law is
unproblematical in serving “dual purposes: to protect the artist
against alteration of the work of art and to protect the public
against alteration or destruction of the culture.”67 For Joseph
Sax, a cultural preservation scholar, moral rights similarly
enable the pursuit of this other vital interest: “When American
legislatures finally began to consider enacting droit moral
statutes, the question understandably arose, why not protect the
art, which is the ultimate product of the artist’s work and the gift
of creative genius to the world, as well as his or her
reputation?”68
A flurry of moral rights bills were introduced in the late
1970s and 80s, at the federal level and in individual states,
primarily aimed at the visual arts.69 Seizing upon America’s
recently-acquired stature in the international art world,
Merryman implored in 1976, “Given the cultural importance of
American art, should our law be modified in such a way as to
protect the integrity of works of art? I believe that the answer to
that question is clearly ‘yes.’ ”70 The literature on moral rights
tracks this “cultural importance,” dramatically increasing as
American art became relevant internationally, economically,
culturally, and in the academic humanities. In 1940, the paucity

67

Id. at 343–44.
SAX, supra note 56, at 22 (“Despite the conceptual distinction . . . protection of
an artist’s moral right can simultaneously implement the society’s interest in
protecting its artistic heritage.”).
69
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (2012) (effective 1985) (applying to
works of “fine art”); CAL. CIVIL CIV. CODE § 987 (West 2012) (effective January 1,
1980) (applying to works of “[f]ine art” of “recognized quality”); Visual Artists Moral
Rights Amendment of 1979, H.R. 288, 96th Cong. (1979) (same); Visual Artists
Moral Rights Amendment of 1977, H.R. 8261, 95th Cong. (1977) (aimed at “the
distortion, mutilation, or other alteration” of “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
works”); Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of
Artists’ Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1, 47
(1980) (“[T]here is little question that at least a right to protect art works from
mutilation is emerging in this country.”).
70
See Merryman, supra note 1, at 1042 (also referencing “the triumph of
American art” as a reason for adopting moral rights). “Triumphalist” rhetoric was a
hallmark of Clement Greenberg’s essays. See, e.g., Clement Greenberg, “AmericanType” Painting, in ART AND CULTURE: CRITICAL ESSAYS 208, 208 (1989).
68
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of scholarship was remarked upon, but by 1980—ten years prior
to VARA—it was already “the subject of exhaustive scholarly
attention.”71
A portion of the enacted state statutes spoke to the public
interest as much as the artists.72 The popular wisdom of
entangling moral rights with the protection of unique objects of
art acquired a stronghold, as summed up by Edward Damich:
“Protecting irreplaceable works from irreversible physical
changes presents the most compelling case for moral rights
protection.”73
II. VARA: OBJECT AND AUTHOR
This section highlights how cultural preservation policy
bested artist-based rationales in VARA’s legislative history. It
then provides a textual analysis demonstrating how VARA’s
operative provisions, despite using moral rights language,
privilege the object over the artist. The section concludes with a
discussion of the mutual restraints embedded in VARA’s dual
objectives.
A.

Legislative History

VARA’s immediate legislative history begins in ambivalence,
with the United States’ accession to the Berne Convention in
1989. Specifically, the United States took steps to ensure that its
accession would require no new legislation, in keeping with its
71

DaSilva, supra note 69, at 39.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(a) (West 2012); CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a)
(“[T]here is also a public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic
creations.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-1 (West 2012); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 989(c)
(effective Jan. 1, 1983) (permitting certain charitable institutions to enforce some
rights granted to artists). The New York statute offered an alternate paradigm. See
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 2012) (making no mention of public or
societal interest in art). At the time VARA was enacted, eleven states had artists’
rights or art preservation statutes, including Massachusetts, Connecticut,
California, New York, Maine, Louisiana, New Jersey, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New
Mexico, and Rhode Island. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 8, 22 n.18 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6919 & n.18.
73
Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a System of
Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 950 (1990); see also
Bird, supra note 9 (“Without moral rights protection artworks could be placed in
jeopardy.”); Elizabeth M. Bock, Note, Using Public Disclosure as the Vesting Point for
Moral Rights Under the Visual Artists Rights Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. 153, 162 (2011)
(noting VARA serves “the public’s interest in preserving its culture through
preserving art”).
72
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longstanding position that functional equivalents to moral rights
could be found in a patchwork of existing state and federal laws,
including contract, privacy torts, unfair competition, defamation,
copyright, the Lanham Act, etc., sufficient to meet the
requirements in Article 6bis.74 Congress enacted the Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, which provided that
Berne was not self-executing and that Berne’s provisions “do not
expand or reduce” existing authors’ rights.75
Further, the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
subsequently excluded Article 6bis from the “rights or
obligations” listed therein.76
Although VARA is clearly related to Berne accession, it was
hardly an inevitable outcome; VARA was enacted on the last day
of the 101st Congress, within a bill authorizing eighty-five new
federal judgeships.77 The proposed bill, contrary to Berne,
limited protection to the visual arts. And Congress was explicit
about its dual agenda: “protect[ing] both the reputations of
certain visual artists and the works of art they create.”78
Notably, copyright inequity for visual artists had long been a
component of the moral rights conversation,79 including lack of
resale royalty rights.80 This concern reappears in VARA’s

74
See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 15, at 25–26; Justin Hughes, American Moral
Rights and Fixing the Dastar “Gap”, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659, 665–68.
75
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568 §§ 2–3,
102 Stat. 2853, 2853 (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C. § 101).
76
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 9,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 304, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf.
77
KWALL, supra note 7, at 28; Peter K. Yu, Moral Rights 2.0, in LANDMARK
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES AND THEIR LEGACY 13, 14 (Christopher Heath &
Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2011).
78
H.R. REP. NO. 101–514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6915.
79
See 123 CONG. REC. E6270–72 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1977) (statement of Rep.
Drinan) (asserting that “ ‘visual’ artists are the least organized and least protected
among artists in America”); Favermann, supra note 59, at 120–21.
80
E.g., Visual Artists’ Rights Act of 1987: Hearing on H.R. 3221 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 3 (1989) (“[T]o secure the rights of authors of pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works to prevent the distortion, mutilation, or other alteration
of such works, to provide for resale royalties, and for other purposes.”); see also 133
CONG. REC. E4257 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1987) (statement of Rep. Markey) (referencing
work by Jasper Johns sold for $3.6 million, purchased for $2,250 in 1960).
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immediate legislative history,81 but what passed in 1990 were the
Berne-mandated non-economic rights of integrity and
attribution.82 VARA rights were rendered waivable.83
While detailing their efforts to limit and contain the bill,
legislators also described the purpose of the statute as
“consistent with the purpose behind the copyright laws and the
Constitutional provision they implement: ‘To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ ”84 Analogous to copyright’s
utilitarian thrust, “ ‘[t]he theory of moral rights is that they
result in a climate of artistic worth and honor that encourages
the author in the arduous act of creation.’ ”85 At times, the bill
was pitched as “fill[ing] a gap” in copyright law that had eluded
visual artists because their work was treated as a “physical piece
of property, rather than as an intellectual work, like a novel.”86
But at other points, more quasi-religious rhetoric was employed,
suggesting a different kind of right altogether, e.g., “[t]his bill
recognizes that title to the soul of an art work does not pass with
the sale of the art work itself.”87
The most consistent argument for moral rights emerged in
art preservation, as its own end.
The Act is specifically
predicated on the “preservation model” of moral rights, whereby
the destruction of works of art not only affects an artist’s
reputation, but also “represents a loss to society.”88 According to
its supporters, “[t]he bill furthers the preservation concept and
provides in the most effective way for the protection of the work by

81
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 7, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,
6918 (“Visual artists, such as painters and sculptors, have complained that . . . the
American copyright system does not enable them to share in any profits upon resale
of their works.”).
82
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2006). Resale royalty rights and waiver were made the
subject of a future study by the Copyright Office. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 608, 104 Stat. 5089, 5132 (1990).
83
17 U.S.C. § 106A(e).
84
H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6915 (footnote
omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
85
Id. (quoting Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2690 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 32 (1990) (statement of Ralph Oman, Reg. of
Copyrights)).
86
136 CONG. REC. H8271 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Markey)
(“It is time that visual artists receive the fundamental copyright protection for the
integrity of their work already provided to authors.”).
87
Id.
88
H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6926.
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giving the artist the right of integrity and the power to enforce
it.”89 Under this construct, artists are cast as enforcement
mechanisms for preserving art rather than persons seeking
copyright parity, private reputational protections, or bargaining
power.
VARA’s legislative history also promotes it as an important
tool in cultural preservation efforts for the public welfare,90 for
example, “By creating a right of integrity, [VARA] . . . protects
society against the mutilation and destruction of those works of
visual art that make up an important part of our cultural
heritage . . . .”91 Professor Jane Ginsburg testified that the
integrity right would not only “enhance the creative environment
in which artists labor,” but would also “enhance our cultural
heritage.”92 Legislators and witnesses littered their statements
with references to “American culture,” “our civilization,” and
“national treasures.”93
VARA’s prototypical art object and its vulnerability was
memorably illustrated. In 1986, two Australian entrepreneurs
purchased a Picasso print, Trois Femmes, cut it into 500 one-inch
squares and offered to sell each square for $135.94
The
consequences of this act, said Representative Markey, constitute
the type of abhorrent, irreparable damage “which passage of the
bill we are discussing today will protect against.”95 As he

89

Id. (emphasis added); see also 135 CONG. REC. E2199 (daily ed. June 20, 1989)
(statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (“We should always remember that the visual arts
covered by this bill meet a special societal need, and that their protection and
preservation serve an important public interest.”).
90
See 133 CONG. REC. E4257 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1987) (statement of Rep.
Markey) (“Works of art . . . belong to no one because they belong to all of us.”).
91
136 CONG. REC. H13,313 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990); see also 135 CONG. REC.
S6811 (daily ed. June 16, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“Congress can no
longer overlook its responsibility to safeguard the Nation’s artistic heritage.”).
92
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2690 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 82 (1990) (statement of Prof. Jane Ginsburg) (emphasizing
“interests of artists and public alike”).
93
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6916–17.
94
136 CONG. REC. H8271 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Markey).
The newspaper ads read, “Yes, your very own beautiful framed Picasso piece, in the
most original and exciting offer.” Id.
95
Id. VARA actually would not have prevented slicing and dicing a painting by
Picasso because the rights inure only to living artists; Picasso died in 1973. R. B.
Ekelund, Jr. et al., The “Death-Effect” in Art Prices: A Demand-Side Exploration, 24
J. CULTURAL ECON. 283, 284 (2000).

FINAL_BONNEAU

2013]

12/11/2013 3:26 PM

CONFLICTED OBJECT IN MORAL RIGHTS LAW

67

explained, intimating the threat of a distinctly public harm, “[w]e
don’t want profiteers roaming the world giving artistic
masterpieces the chop.”96
B.

VARA’s Text

As suggested by VARA’s somewhat hasty, surreptitious
enactment, its text was not subject to intensive discussion or
deliberation,97 and it offers an odd balance of personhood and
object interests.
VARA’s author-orientation is manifest
principally through limitations on the rights it confers, such as
non-transferability and duration fixed at the author’s life.98 The
statute’s protected class is defined and delimited by the object, as
are the implementing provisions of the right of integrity.
1.

Art, Defined

VARA created a new category of works of art rather than
utilizing copyright law’s preexisting definition, “pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works.”99 As a co-sponsor explained, “we
have gone to extreme lengths to very narrowly define the works
of art that will be covered.”100 VARA’s limited reach to unique
physical objects that exist in single copies or limited editions was
viewed as a “critical underpinning of the limited scope of the
bill”101 and was associated with the preservation agenda.102
VARA’s “work of visual art” consists of “a painting, drawing,
print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy,” as well as “a still
photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,” or
96

136 CONG. REC. H8271 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Markey).
See supra text accompanying note 77; see also KWALL, supra note 7, at 147
(arguing that VARA’s primary problem arises from lack of thoughtful deliberation).
98
17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(d)(1), (e) (2006). An exception to lifetime duration applies if
the work at issue was created before the effective date of the statute, assuming title
has not yet transferred. In that instance, the moral rights term is coextensive with
the copyright term provided under § 106. Id. § 106A(d)(2). For collaborative works,
the duration extends to the last surviving author. Id. § 106A(d)(3). Lifetime duration
is inconsistent with Berne’s requirement that moral rights last for a period
coextensive with copyright protection in each member state. See KWALL, supra note
7, at 37.
99
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5).
100
135 CONG. REC. E2227 (daily ed. June 20, 1989) (statement of Rep. Markey).
101
H.R. REP. NO. 101–514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6921.
102
See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. H3114 (daily ed. June 5, 1990) (statement by Rep.
Moorhead) (“[T]his narrow definition is essential to ensuring that the legislation is
limited to protecting and preseving [sic] qualifying works that exist in single copies
or limited editions.”).
97
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signed, numbered limited editions of the same.103 In conjunction
with this selective inventory, VARA also identifies exclusions,
most notably a “motion picture or other audiovisual work,” and a
work made for hire or one made for promotional or advertising
purposes.104 VARA also bars “any work not subject to copyright
protection under this title.”105
2.

Prohibiting Modification, and Exceptions

Although VARA’s modification provision is aimed at
prejudice to an artist’s “honor or reputation,”106 it does not
recognize any harm that leaves the original object intact.107
Thus, distortion of a reproduction, however widely disseminated
or personally injurious, is not within VARA’s purview.108 For
example, VARA offered no assistance to Frederick Hart in his
lawsuit against Warner Brothers for its rendition of his sculpture

103

17 U.S.C. § 101. The full provisions read:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast,
carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively
numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark
of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition
of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the
author.

Id.
104

Id.
Id.
106
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (language adopted verbatim from Berne
Convention). An author of a work of visual art has the right “to prevent any
intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right.” Id.
107
Id. § 106A(c)(3) (providing that any “reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or
other use of a work is not a destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification
described in paragraph (3) of subsection (a)”).
108
See id. To contrast, in a French case from 1911, the son of Francois Millet
brought an action against two publishers for their reproductions of Millet’s painting,
The Angelus. Millet’s son argued that both publishers should be enjoined from
publication for misrepresenting his father’s work. The court agreed that changes in a
woman’s bonnet and scarf, lighting, and other similarly “vulgar” modifications
constituted an offense of Millet’s right of integrity. Similarly, a French court found
that Galeries Lafayette, a department store, violated Henri Rousseau’s right of
integrity by displaying reproductions of his work in a different color and form than
the original. See Merryman, supra note 1, at 1029–30 (discussing the Millet and
Rousseau cases).
105
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Ex Nihilo in the film Devil’s Advocate, given that the original
object was untouched.109
One commentator explains that
“imposing liability in these situations would not further the
paramount goal of the legislation: to preserve and protect certain
categories of original works of art.”110
Despite the oft-mentioned public interest in preserving art,
VARA is disassociated from the act of displaying art to the
public; in theory, a mutilated object may injure the artist’s honor
or reputation even if it remains hidden in a closet.111 As a
corollary, the discontinued display of an art work is not
prohibited if the object remains unaltered.112 Finally, the statute
specifically excepts modification caused by “public presentation,
including lighting and placement,” unless resulting from gross
negligence.113
3.

Destroying Art

VARA’s anti-destruction provision, ironically, exceeds the
norms of virtually all civil and common law countries, as well as
the minimalist requirements of Berne, by redressing the
intentional or grossly negligent destruction of art.114 As the
109
The movie featured Satan as a managing partner of a New York law firm,
and his penthouse included a wall-sized bas-relief resembling Ex Nihilo. Near the
end, the human forms in the bas-relief appear to writhe erotically, which Hart found
offensive to his beliefs. See 2 RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE
GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 1282–83 (3d ed. 2005).
The case settled, with Warner agreeing to edit the DVD version and attach a
disclaimer. Id.; see also The Devil’s Advocate—Warner Bros. and Frederick Hart,
BENEDICT.COM, http://www.benedict.com/visual/devil/devil.aspx (last visited Oct. 10,
2013) (showing video clips and disclaimer).
110
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8D.06(B)(2) (2010), quoted in Berrios Nogueras v. Home Depot, 330 F. Supp. 2d 48,
51 (D.P.R. 2004) (dismissing a VARA action based on unauthorized reproduction of
painting in advertising brochures).
111
See, e.g., Pavia v. 1120 Ave. of the Ams. Assocs., 901 F. Supp. 620, 627
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“VARA lays its focus on the acts of alteration themselves, without
reference to subsequent display.”).
112
English v. BFC & R E. 11th St. LLC, No. 97 Civ. 7446(HB), 1997 WL 746444,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997) (finding VARA inapplicable when real estate
development would obstruct the view of several murals because the murals “will not
be physically altered in any way”).
113
17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) (2006).
114
Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (providing the right “to prevent any destruction of a work
of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that
work is a violation of that right”). For further discussion on destruction, see sources
cited supra note 19. Although one might read into Berne a “right ‘of preservation’,” it
is not required expressly. Justin Hughes, The Line Between Work and Framework,
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Second Circuit aptly observed in the first VARA case litigated,
protecting a work from destruction “represents a fundamentally
different perception of the purpose of moral rights,”115 meaning
one based on “the public interest in preserving a nation’s
culture.”116 If the right protects personality, the court elaborated,
“destruction is seen as less harmful than the continued display of
deformed or mutilated work that misrepresents the artist.”117
Only works of “recognized stature” warrant protection from
complete destruction, a gatekeeping mechanism not defined in
the statute nor required by the mutilation provision.118 In
considering the proposed beneficiaries of this right—artist and
society—it is only consistent with the latter that the protected
work has stature.119 Finally, this provision does not include the
“honor or reputation” language employed under modification.120

Text and Context, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 22 (2001). The closest
approximation of such a right would be in Swiss law, where an owner must offer to
sell the work back to its creator prior to destruction. KWALL, supra note 7, at 44.
115
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995).
116
Id.; see also Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 324 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (“This provision is preservative in nature: Congress was concerned that the
destruction of works of art represented a significant societal loss.”), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995); 136 CONG. REC. H3113 (daily ed. June 5,
1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (explaining that the destruction provision
was included because “[s]ociety is the ultimate loser when . . . works are modified or
destroyed”).
117
Carter, 71 F.3d at 81–82. However, several commentators contend that
protecting an artist’s work from destruction soundly supports a personality-based
integrity right, positing destruction as the endpoint of disrespect on a continuum
with mutilation. See, e.g., id. (citing 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE 1044 n.128 (1994)); 5 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 16:24
(2012) (“Destruction of a work certainly shows the utmost contempt for the artist's
honor or reputation.”); KWALL, supra note 7, at 45 (arguing that the notion of
destruction having no adverse consequences “is not relevant to those instances
where a work is destroyed in a manner that subjects the creator to shame or
embarrassment”); Robinson, supra note 8, at 1964 (“[T]here is little validity to the
argument that the complete destruction of an artist’s work of art results in no harm
to his honor or reputation.”).
118
In theory, the artist need not have recognized stature. See Robinson, supra
note 8, at 1952; cf. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 325 n.12 (opining that work may attain
stature after filing lawsuit).
119
See, e.g., Damich, supra note 73, at 955 (“[A]dopting a quality criterion
changes the focus of the statute from moral rights to art preservation.”).
120
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2006). However, omission of the honor or
reputation language may simply reflect oversight or careless drafting. See supra
notes 77, 97 and accompanying text.
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The Paralysis of Equipoise

VARA’s proposition of protecting the artist and preserving
the object, while seemingly an enhancement of traditional moral
rights, is substantially limiting at either end. Some of the
consequences for artists are identified in the preceding section.
In addition, at the policy level, emphasizing physical
preservation and types of objects marginalizes the intrinsic,
intellectual dimension of producing art, a result that nearly
subverts the statute’s grounding as intellectual property law.121
Jane Ginsburg has described VARA as a private “Landmarks
law” for art work, asserting “real moral rights do more than
that.”122 More pejoratively, a major treatise complains that “[a]t
the abstract (or perhaps fustian) level, traditional copyright law
protects art; by contrast, the Visual Artists Rights Act protects
artifacts.”123
In addition, despite emphatic containment, VARA’s object
focus negatively redounds to other forms of creative expression.
Because VARA only encompasses unique objects, its core mission
of protecting authorship interests seems ill-disposed for
incremental expansion to other media, whose regular existence is
in copies.124 This is problematic if, like Professor Kwall, one
believes that “[a]uthors of literary, musical, and other
copyrighted works are as vulnerable to moral rights violations as
are visual artists.”125 Several scholars contend that VARA’s
narrow class of eligible objects has fostered “negative spillover”
effects;126 not only are state statutes preempted, but VARA’s

121
As noted, one stated premise of the VARA was achieving copyright parity for
visual artists. See 135 CONG. REC. E2227 (daily ed. June 20, 1989) (statement of
Rep. Markey) (“Unlike the works of literary or performing artists, artworks created
by visual artists are treated more as physical objects then as expressions of the
artistic creativity of their authors.”); supra notes 79, 86 and accompanying text.
122
Jane C. Ginsburg, Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age in the United
States?, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 9, 10–11 (2001).
123
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 110, § 8D.06(A)(2) (footnotes omitted).
124
See The 101st Congress: A Review of Amendments to the Copyright Act, 37 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 462, 466 (1990) (“[VARA] should be regarded as an initial,
extremely tentative step toward a federal regime for moral rights.”).
125
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories”: Narrative’s Implications for
Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 30
(2001); see also KWALL, supra note 7, at 148–49 (calling for expanded protection).
126
See, e.g., Bird, supra note 9, at 424 (“Courts now invariably interpret VARA
to mean that no cause of action outside of VARA, regardless of its origin, can support
a claim that resembles a moral right because of VARA’s narrow application.”).
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existence has been construed as a pronouncement that Congress
affirmatively rejects any right resembling moral rights outside of
its limited scope.127 Thus, courts may have been more willing to
entertain matters of authorial dignity before VARA framed the
issue as one exclusive to fine art objects.128
However, despite its considerable emphasis on the physical
object, VARA is not a functional preservation statute.129 VARA’s
preservation objective is reciprocally delimited by its personhood
interests, most prominently the lifetime duration.130 Accordingly,
a major fallacy of the Trois Femmes example relied upon by
legislators is that VARA would not have prevented “the chop,”
because Picasso was dead. The statute lacks a key attribute of
cultural preservation initiatives: perpetuity, or at least a decisive
term, and, correspondingly, someone to exercise the right other
than the artist.131 Moreover, VARA’s preservation goals limit
America’s cultural heritage to not just art, but contemporary art.
127
See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34–35
(2003); Rigamonti, supra note 22, at 405–08.
128
See, e.g., Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 363, 372, 267
N.Y.S.2d 594, 603–04 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1966), aff’d, 25 A.D.2d 830, 269 N.Y.S.2d
913 (1st Dep’t), aff’d, 18 N.Y.2d 659, 219 N.E.2d 431, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80. In that case,
the defendant licensed Otto Preminger’s motion picture Anatomy of a Murder for
television viewing. Preminger sought an injunction, complaining that the license
agreements gave stations the right to cut portions of his film and offer commercial
interruptions, which he claimed detracted from the film’s “artistic merit” and
damaged his reputation. The court stated that “the law is not so rigid, even in the
absence of contract, as to leave a party without protection against publication of a
garbled version of his work.” Id. at 366, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 599. Although the court held
for the defendant, it implied that if the movie were significantly mutilated, the
director might have a case. Id. at 372, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 603–04.
129
Many scholars have focused on rectifying this aspect of its agenda. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Dillinger, Note, Mutilating Picasso: The Case for Amending the Visual
Artists Rights Act To Provide Protection of Moral Rights After Death, 75 UMKC L.
REV. 897, 899–900 (2007); Cambra E. Stern, Comment, A Matter of Life or Death:
The Visual Artists Rights Act and the Problem of Postmortem Moral Rights, 51
UCLA L. REV. 849, 852 (2004); Seth Tipton, Note, Connoisseurship Corrected:
Protecting the Artist, the Public and the Role of Art Museums Through the
Amendment of VARA, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 269, 274 (2009).
130
Cf. Thomas J. Davis, Jr., Fine Art and Moral Rights: The Immoral Triumph
of Emotionalism, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 317, 361 (1989) (asserting with respect to
state moral rights statutes that “[l]imited duration seems inconsistent with the
interest of preservation”); Patty Gerstenblith, Architect as Artist: Artists’ Rights and
Historic Preservation, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 431, 463 (1994) (concluding that
artists’ moral rights are not really intended for cultural preservation, due to lifetime
limitation).
131
VARA’s reliance on self-selection also does not make desirable preservation
policy.
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A masterpiece so renowned posthumously—the usual
circumstance—will have no protection, making for strange
omissions in this putative collection of American history.132
In sum, considering its dual ambitions, VARA is highly
flawed. The next section unbundles the contradictions that
inhere in fashioning moral rights around objects.
III. OBJECT AND OBJECTIVE: SITES OF CONFLICT
Because VARA aims to protect the integrity of objects, a
district court found a “painful irony” when Swiss artist Christoph
Büchel sought, in conjunction with his VARA counterclaims
against the Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art
(“MASS MoCA”), to have his own work destroyed.133 Two years
prior, Büchel had embarked on an installation called Training
Ground for Democracy in MASS MoCA’s football field-sized
gallery known as “Building 5,” at the museum’s expense.134 As
the work progressed, the relationship between Büchel and the
museum became acrimonious, and Büchel eventually terminated
the project, accusing MASS MoCA of not following his
instructions and exhibiting a lack of professionalism. At this
point, the museum had invested nearly $300,000—well over
budget—and had postponed the already-publicized exhibition in
an effort to meet Büchel’s demands and instructions, often
delivered off-site. MASS MoCA sought a declaratory judgment
from a federal district court that it was entitled to display the
work in its unfinished state, and Büchel counterclaimed under
VARA, along with a request to have the work destroyed at the
museum’s expense.135
132

Professor Sax has remarked that “the operative provisions of [VARA] are
unmistakably focused on the rights of the artist, rather than of the society.” SAX,
supra note 56, at 26.
133
As the district court noted, its comment was technically tangential to the
legal issues because there is no cause of action to seek destruction under VARA;
Büchel merely supplemented his moral rights claims with this request. See Mass.
Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 565 F. Supp. 2d 245, 260 n.7
(D. Mass. 2008), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 593 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2010).
134
This arrangement was never memorialized in writing. Id. at 250.
135
The district court held for the museum and dismissed Büchel’s VARA claims.
See id. at 261. Despite the ensuing appeal, Büchel’s request for destruction became
moot when the museum changed course and elected not to pursue the exhibition.
The First Circuit partially vacated and partially affirmed the district court’s order
dismissing Büchel’s claims and, in relevant part, held that Büchel had raised a
material issue of fact as to whether the museum had modified the installation over
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There was a “painful irony” in this case, wrote the district
court in a footnote, because “one critical purpose of VARA is to
preserve art.”136
The court explained, citing Franz Kafka,
Vladimir Nabokov, and the poet Virgil, that, “[t]he public as the
beneficiary of great art has its own legitimate interest in
preservation, which sometimes can trump the artist’s will.”137
Judge Posner’s positioning of the public interest over that of
the artist illustrates how VARA’s object orientation has
decentered its moral rights agenda.
Once authorship is
subordinated to the preservation of “great art,” VARA loses its
footing in copyright law’s doctrinal terrain. Neither does U.S.
policy or law offer a strong foundation for preserving visual art as
a form of cultural heritage. Indeed, it becomes fair to question
what VARA is doing at all.
This section is divided into three parts, reflecting facets of
the archetypal objects implicated under the statute: material,
cultural, and transcendent. These qualities carry assumptions
that inform VARA’s preservation theme, yet when
contextualized, reveal conflicting impulses that have belied
VARA’s implementation and discourse over the past two decades.
A.

The Physical Object
“VARA established a new and distinct genus of art: ‘work[s] of
visual art . . . .’ ”138

By assuming art preservation as a critical purpose, VARA
adopts a museological stance. It embraces the primacy of the
unique, authentic art object as evidence of the author’s genius
and as a complete narrative unto itself.139 Its broader cultural
narrative is thus hierarchical, segregating certain types of
material goods for heightened protection—an endeavor not

Büchel’s objections, and as to whether the alleged modifications had a detrimental
impact on the artist’s honor or reputation. See Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art
Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 65–66 (1st Cir. 2010).
136
Buchel, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 260 n.7.
137
Id. at 249 n.1. These authors charged others with posthumous destruction of
certain unpublished works. See id.
138
Lilley v. Stout, 384 F. Supp. 2d 83, 86 (D.D.C. 2005).
139
See Jan Marontate, Rethinking Permanence and Change in Contemporary
Cultural Preservation Strategies, 34 J. ARTS MGM’T L. & SOC’Y 285, 286 (2005)
(“[P]rofessional standards and practices in the museum field developed in a context
where the art object itself was the primary record of the creative act.”). The museum
retrospective of an artist or catalogue raisonne exemplify this approach.
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dissimilar to that undertaken by a museum of contemporary
art.140
However, as a federal statute with mandates and
penalties, VARA raises the stakes, translating aesthetics into
law.141 Moreover, unlike a museum, its actual space is relatively
unbounded and its cultural authority negligible.
This section charts the conflicts prompted by objects whose
cultural meaning resides in the interstices of physical and
intellectual property. This section also examines the legally and
art historically fraught enterprise of VARA’s implied material
hierarchy.
1.

VARA’s Material World

Although courts systematically reiterate the lofty rhetoric of
the artist’s spirit and honor culled from VARA’s legislative
history,142 the tangible object is usually dispositive of the claim.
Many cases do not survive the threshold assessment of whether
the subject constitutes a work of art under VARA’s definition,143
140
Gertrude Stein famously considered this brand of museum impossible. See
Bruce Altshuler, Collecting the New: A Historical Introduction, in COLLECTING THE
NEW 1, 1 (Bruce Altshuler ed., 2007).
141
I would distinguish the kind of “aesthetic justice” implicit in the museum
institution. See Robert Storr, To Have and To Hold, in COLLECTING THE NEW, supra
note 140, at 29, 39–40 (likening museum acquisition process to courtroom).
142
See, e.g., Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593
F.3d 38, 49 (1st Cir. 2010); Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 133
(1st Cir. 2006) (“The theory of moral rights is that they result in a climate of artistic
worth and honor that encourages the author in the arduous act of creation.”)
(citations omitted); Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 611 (7th Cir. 1999);
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing moral rights
as “rights of a spiritual, non-economic and personal nature [that] . . . spring from a
belief that an artist in the process of creation injects his spirit into the work”).
143
E.g., Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 306 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding art
work consisting of a living garden was not protectable under VARA because it lacked
fixity required for copyright protection), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011); Nat’l
Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. (NASCAR) v. Scharle, 184 F. App’x 270, 276
(3d Cir. 2006) (finding plaintiff’s drawings for NASCAR trophy did not meet VARA
definition because they did not exist in a single copy or as limited edition, or
alternatively because they were technical drawings); Phillips, 459 F.3d at 143
(holding VARA’s definition of art does not include site-specific works of art); Pollara
v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 271 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding mural did not meet VARA’s
definition of art because it was promotional in nature); Carter, 71 F.3d at 88 (holding
that sculpture constituted work made for hire and therefore did not meet VARA’s
definition of a work of art); Landrau v. Solis Betancourt, 554 F. Supp. 2d 102, 111
(D.P.R. 2007) (finding neither architectural plans nor designs embodied in the
building were within VARA’s definition of art); Lilley, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 88–89
(finding photographic prints were not art under VARA because they were not
produced exclusively for exhibition purposes); Peker v. Masters Collection, 96 F.
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which courts have interpreted narrowly.
VARA case law
frequently appears less concerned with authorship than artifact
taxonomy.
VARA’s answer to the philosophical query “what is art?” is a
classification scheme principally organized by physical medium
and traditional qualities of uniqueness and rarity.
VARA
incorporates a particular idea about the role of art in certain
purpose-based requirements, such as the photograph “produced
for exhibition purposes only,” or the advertising exclusion. The
limited edition Trois Femmes lithograph in the Picasso example
suggests the prototypical unique, autonomous object created for
the aesthetic “use” of hanging on a wall. But VARA objects, at
least in the published case law, look different. They are, for
example, less autonomous from their environments, physically or
conceptually or both.144 And they are typically large-scale,

Supp. 2d 216, 221–22 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding posters excluded from VARA’s
definition of art); see also Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 329 (5th
Cir. 2010) (finding wrecked, painted automobile used as cactus planter to be
symbolic of store’s corporate image and therefore promotional in nature, outside
VARA’s protection); Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582–83 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting
in dicta that note cards and lithographs existed neither as single copies nor signed
limited editions, precluding applicability of VARA); Cheffins v. Stewart, No. 3:09CV-00130-RAM, 2011 WL 1233378 (D. Nev. Mar. 29, 2011) (work in which façade of
sixteenth-century Spanish galleon was wrapped around school bus constituted
applied art, precluded from VARA’s embrace by definition).
144
See, e.g., Kelley, 635 F.3d at 291 (two football-field sized gardens in public
space); Phillips, 459 F.3d at 130 (public sculpture park); Carter, 71 F.3d at 80
(sculpture built into lobby of building); Hunter v. Squirrel Hill Assocs., 413 F. Supp.
2d 517, 518 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (mural on exterior of building); Bd. of Managers of Soho
Int’l Arts Condo. v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 1226 DAB, 2003 WL 21403333, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003) (mural on exterior of building); Hanrahan v. Ramirez,
No. 2:97-CV-7470 RAP RC, 1998 WL 34369997, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 1998)
(outdoor mural); English v. BFC & R E. 11th St. LLC, No. 97 Civ. 7446(HB), 1997
WL 746444, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997) (five murals on outside of buildings plus
garden sculptures), aff’d, 198 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 1999).
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designed for an outdoor, public or quasi-public, venue.145 They
are made from non-traditional materials, not exclusively
controlled by the artist’s hand.146
Part of this rift arises from the law’s cultural lag. Although
VARA is associated with the Romantic author, Anne Barron, who
has persuasively argued that the type of object implicated in a
taxonomy of aesthetic species or types looks more like a product
of modernism than romanticism: “stable, fixed, closed, selfcontained, and autonomous of its context and audience.”147 The
modernist sensibility became the target of assault in the 1960s,
by artists selecting time-sensitive or ephemeral materials,
performance art, conceptual art, deliberate destruction, and art
dependent on its environment.148 Many of these postmodern
tendencies, particularly “anti-art” practices and ideas of
collective authorship, were discussed by Professor Adler, who
defied the scholarly crusade for greater moral rights by arguing
that moral rights law “protects and reifies a notion of art that is
dead.”149
Professor Adler’s argument accurately reflects one version of
art history, in which “art” died in the 1960s, having exhausted its
aesthetic potential.150 This Article accounts for art’s afterlife.
That is, while the materials and events encompassed as “art”
have expanded since the era of historical modernism, the core
145
All of the above examples could be recited here. In addition, see Pollara, 344
F.3d at 266 (10 by 30-foot banner); Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 610
(7th Cir. 1999) (large outdoor stainless steel sculpture); Jackson v. Curators of Univ.
of Mo., No. 11-4023-CV-C-MJW, 2011 WL 5838432 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 2011) (glasstiled mosaic on campus grounds), vacated, No. 11-4023-CV-C-MJW, 2012 WL
3166654 (W.D. Mo. May 15, 2012); Scott v. Dixon, 309 F. Supp. 2d 395, 396–97
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (40 by 10-foot steel sculpture of a swan weighing 6,000 pounds). The
public nature of most disputed works suggests that audience is both an important
stake in and perhaps a triggering feature of many VARA conflicts; in terms of
reputation, the artist has more to gain by bringing suit than with an object tucked
away in a private home, and also has more to lose.
146
Kelley, 635 F.3d at 291 (work comprised of wildflower gardens); Büchel, 593
F.3d at 65–66 (large-scale installation comprised of found objects by off-site
instruction of artist).
147
Anne Barron, Copyright Law and the Claims of Art, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 368,
370 (2002).
148
See generally THOMAS CROW, THE RISE OF THE SIXTIES: AMERICAN AND
EUROPEAN ART IN THE ERA OF DISSENT (2005).
149
Adler, supra note 10.
150
See ARTHUR C. DANTO, AFTER THE END OF ART: CONTEMPORARY ART AND
THE PALE OF HISTORY 21 (1999) (arguing that modernism reached a historical
closure, after which art became “post-historical” or philosophy).
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notion of “art” in the broad sense of visual and intellectual
creation continues evolving.151
Further, although formerly
reliable demarcations have dissolved,152 a societal matrix
comprised of creators, museums, collectors, conservators, critics,
and audiences continue to recognize a distinction between art
and non-art, just not necessarily with uniformity either within or
among these groups.153 Thus, while Professor Adler views the
law in its collision154 with contemporary art, this Article presents
its entanglement and the resulting chaos of meanings.
Although unique objects persist as art today, VARA’s status
as copyright law has been strained by their sheer physical size.
If intellectual property law has been challenged by public
ambivalence in recognizing property boundaries that exist only in
law, e.g., illegal downloads of music,155 VARA cases exacerbate an
already counterintuitive proposition. It asks the owner not just
to observe an invisible legal boundary, but to affirmatively
disregard the exclusive rights that typically flow from a valid

151

My view is thus consistent with developments other than conceptual art or
“anti-art,” including those arising from the availability of electronic media, which
have influenced artistic practices since VARA’s enactment in 1990. Peter Yu has, in
this light, appropriately differentiated between the obsolescence of VARA’s objectoriented approach in the online world and moral rights “as an institution.” See Yu,
supra note 77, at 17.
152
See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Postmodernism, Representation, Law, 29 U. HAW. L.
REV. 377, 402 (2007) (“[P]ostmodernism repeatedly questions the clean, reassuring
divisions of modernism.”); see also Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L.
REV. 805, 814 (2005) (“Certain current art practice is about breaking down the doors
of art’s exalted cloister and exploding the definition of art, especially definitions that
envision a narrow ‘high’ art.”). Contemporary art has also challenged museum
curators and art conservators. See Graham Larkin, Things Fall Apart, ARTFORUM,
Apr. 2008, at 153, 156 (“Good luck trying to acquire, store, or present vintage
performance art, environmental art, Conceptual art, or appropriation art while
maintaining a clear distinction between art and context, art and life, art and
artifact, art and interpretation, high and low, original and copy, or completion and
incompletion.”).
153
That artists continue to produce paintings suggests a non-linear progression.
154
Adler, supra note 10 (“[T]he law is on a collision course with the very art it
seeks to defend.”).
155
See Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 793, 801–02 (2001) (discussing public resistance to recognizing intangible
products as property); Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric, 13
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 881, 891 (2011) (discussing efforts by motion picture and
recording industries to frame file sharing as theft through analogies to stealing
tangible property like cars).
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sale and lawful possession of the material object. When that
object is massive, VARA potentially imperils real property
ownership.156
The potential to burden real property increases when the
object’s meaning is contingent on its immediate environment, as
with site-specific art. Site-specific work poses a formidable
challenge to VARA from a property perspective,157 and art
historically, because it rejects autonomy, a condition of
modernism.158 The First Circuit, confronted with changes made
to a public sculpture park, categorically excluded site-specific
work from VARA’s purview.159 To achieve this result, the court
considered real property interests, but struggled in reaching a
rationale that comported with the statute’s goals, incongruously
explaining that its holding “[did] not denigrate the value or
importance of site-specific art, which unmistakably enriches our
culture and the beauty of our public spaces.”160 If one primary
goal of VARA is to preserve art as a cultural and aesthetic good,
however, then the court denigrated the value of site-specific art.
This Article’s point is not to weigh art’s value against real
property, but to reveal the hierarchy that becomes
institutionalized under VARA and its potential asynchrony with
cultural values.
A more recent case pressed further, challenging not only
spatial impact but the kind of materials that may constitute an
art object: The piece was comprised of two flower beds, each
nearly the size of a football field, situated in downtown
Chicago.161 The district court found that artist Chapman Kelley’s

156
See supra text accompanying notes 144–145. As Patty Gerstenblith aptly
projected, “[I]n a case of a conflict between the artist’s rights and the rights of a real
property owner, the latter will still receive greater protection.” Gerstenblith, supra
note 130, at 454.
157
Francesca Garson, Note, Before that Artist Came Along, It Was Just a Bridge:
The Visual Artists Rights Act and the Removal of Site-Specific Artwork, 11 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 205 (2001) (describing the notion that an object could hijack
the property on which it stands as “Congress’ worst nightmare”).
158
See Barron, supra note 147.
159
Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 131, 142–43 (1st Cir.
2006); cf. Hughes, supra note 114, at 25 (“The popular belief that there is a strong
boundary between work and framework is apparent in the provisions of the VARA.”).
160
Phillips, 459 F.3d at 142–43.
161
Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04 C 07715, 2008 WL 4449886, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 29, 2008), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011).
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work qualified as a “painting” or “sculpture” under VARA’s
definition, but was not copyrightable because it was not
sufficiently “original.”162 Alternately, the court found that the
work was not protected under VARA following the First Circuit’s
logic: Because it was site-specific.163 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit found the work sufficiently original for copyright
purposes and declined to adopt a categorical exclusion of sitespecific work from VARA; however, the circuit court rejected
Wildflower Works from VARA’s scope because it lacked the fixity
While
and authorship requirements of copyright.164
acknowledging that “the artistic community might classify
Kelley’s garden as a work of postmodern conceptual art,”165 the
circuit court found it was “quintessentially a garden,” and thus
not copyrightable.166
Importantly, the circuit court also cast doubt on the district
court’s conclusion that Wildflower Works was a “painting” or
“sculpture” under VARA—a finding that it noted, with
incredulity, the defendant had not challenged on appeal.167 The
circuit court underscored VARA’s limiting purpose with respect
to section 102(a)(5) of the Copyright Act, which uses adjectives
like “pictorial” and “sculptural” that “suggest[] flexibility and
breadth in application.”168 In contrast, VARA’s definition, relying
on “nouns,” requires that the work “must actually be a ‘painting’
or a ‘sculpture.’ Not metaphorically or by analogy, but really.”169
In the circuit court’s aggressively literal interpretation, which
explicitly discounted the artist’s intent, an art historian’s

162
Id. at *6 (“Kelley leaves this Court to assume that he is the first person to
ever conceive of and express an arrangement of growing wildflowers in ellipseshaped enclosed area in the manner in which he created his exhibit.”).
163
Id. at *6–7.
164
Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 302–03, 306–07 (7th Cir. 2011).
165
Id. at 304.
166
Id. at 306.
167
Id. at 300 (“This is an astonishing omission.”).
168
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2006)).
169
Id. (citing the 17 U.S.C. § 101 definition of a “work of visual art”).

FINAL_BONNEAU

2013]

12/11/2013 3:26 PM

CONFLICTED OBJECT IN MORAL RIGHTS LAW

81

testimony, and the defendant’s own marketing of the piece as
“living art,”170 the circuit court relied only on a dictionary
defining the terms “painting” and “sculpture.”171
2.

Art, by Authority of Law

As theorized by Professors Merryman and Sax, the moral
rights doctrine tracks, and even serves, art history. America’s
artistic success justified artists’ rights that would likewise
protect significant art. Both the Kelley and Phillips courts,
however, interpreted VARA as a more autonomous project,
expressing fidelity to legal norms or rigid definitions that conflict
with how the art community might value a given work.
This is a significant problem for VARA’s preservation
agenda. Indeed, the domains of law and art history cannot be
disentangled in VARA case law because the statute is predicated
on an eminently art historical act: the determination of whether
an object receives protection that supersedes the owner’s
discretion because it is classifiable as art. VARA’s most basic
inquiry thus affronts a prominent copyright law taboo, what
Christine Haight Farley calls the “doctrine of avoidance” of
rendering artistic determinations,172 inspired by Holmes’s
admonition that entertaining the merits of art is a “dangerous
undertaking.”173
170
The court found the artist’s intent not dispositive and appeared to concur
with the district court that the artist’s expert (an art historian) was unhelpful. It
further stated that the defendant’s marketing of the piece as “living art” “add[ed]
little to the analysis.” Id. at 300–01.
171
Id. at 301 n.7. The court acknowledged the lower court’s regard for the
“tension between the law and the evolution of ideas in modern or avant garden art,”
but concluded, “there’s a big difference between avoiding a literalistic approach and
embracing one that is infinitely malleable.” The court aligned the district court’s
decision with the latter. Id. at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted).
172
Farley, supra note 152, at 815.
173
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). The
passage reads: “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of
genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them
repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their author
spoke.” Id. In deference to this famous warning, VARA opinions are occasionally
accompanied by disclaimers. See, e.g., Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 271 (2d Cir.
2003) (“We steer clear of an interpretation of VARA that would require courts to
assess either the worth of a purported work of visual art, or the worth of the purpose
for which the work was created.”); Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 610
(7th Cir. 1999) (“We are not art critics, do not pretend to be and do not need to be to
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Although commentators have typically focused on the
“recognized stature” requirement in VARA’s anti-destruction
provision as the ignominious path to qualitative assessments of
art by judges, this Article argues, consistent with Professor
Farley’s analysis, that the liminal definition of a “work of visual
art” is equally qualitative.174 To identify an object as “art”
presupposes a particular meaning and value; “not art” suggests
their absence. VARA is a unique site for this nexus of law and
art because an artistic determination is not simply required to
enforce a right, but is the reason for the right.
Evaluation inheres in classification because the designation
“art” is historically and socially informed. For example, even the
simple bifurcation in the First Circuit’s site-specific
designation—that some works derive meaning from their
environment, while others are immune and purely selfcontained—elides a more complex process of how artistic
meaning is generated. According to the Phillips court:
A simple example of a work of integrated art that is not sitespecific is Marcel Duchamp’s work ‘Bicycle Wheel’, a sculpture
integrating a bicycle fork, a bicycle wheel, and a stool in a
particular arrangement. However, this sculpture does not
integrate its location and could be part of a traveling exhibition
of Duchamp’s work without losing its artistic meaning or being
destroyed.175

By explaining site-specific as a function of immobility, the
court overlooks the fact that Duchamp’s readymades were
entirely context-dependent when first introduced. Duchamp
deliberately selected commonly recognized objects to make the

decide this case.”); id. at 615 (Manion, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“Like my colleagues, I am not an art critic. So I begin with the well-worn
adage that one man’s junk is another man’s treasure.”); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear,
Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[C]ourts have persistently shunned the
role of art critic.”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995). But cf.
Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247,
249–50 (1998) (arguing that the distinction between judicial reasoning and aesthetic
reasoning is illusory).
174
See Farley, supra note 152, at 820–21.
175
Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 140 n.9 (1st Cir. 2006)
(citations omitted).

FINAL_BONNEAU

2013]

12/11/2013 3:26 PM

CONFLICTED OBJECT IN MORAL RIGHTS LAW

83

point that the only distinction from their ordinary status
occurred by placement in the sacred realm of the museum.176 It
was not a matter of scale and physical mobility.
The readymade revealed that the seemingly neutral museum
was itself a value-charged environment infused with a coded
command that the objects contained within be revered as art.
The First Circuit’s classification stumbles on a similarly
presumed neutrality—relying on an art historical canon that
commands works by Duchamp constitute art—and again
demonstrates the inherently historical contingency of an
“objective” taxonomy.177
Legislators provided a liberal means of responding to
VARA’s threshold query by advising courts to “use common sense
and generally accepted standards of the artistic community in
determining whether a particular work falls within the scope of
However, problems arise in the conflict
the definition.”178
between these two sources, common sense and generally accepted
standards, as when the Seventh Circuit preferred the former,
severing artistic community standards from its assessment that
Wildflower Works constituted neither a painting nor a
sculpture.179 An analogous appeal to common sense occurred
when the Second Circuit rejected a large mural from VARA’s
embrace pursuant to the advertising exclusion, based on the
work’s “objective and evident purpose.”180 Ironically, in Bleistein,
the court found that a picture used for advertising should receive
the same copyright protection as “fine art.”
The opinion
expressed concern that judges might exclude advertisements

176

See MARTHA BUSKIRK, THE CONTINGENT OBJECT OF CONTEMPORARY ART
70–71 (2003).
177
The misalignment of conceptual art and copyright law has received increased
attention in recent years. See Charles Cronin, Dead on the Vine: Living and
Conceptual Art and VARA, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 209, 212, 214 (2010)
(arguing that conceptual art should be categorically excluded from copyright
protection).
178
Pollara, 344 F.3d at 269 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6921) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1995); Flack v. Friends of Queen
Catherine Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
179
Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 304 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 380 (2011) (“We fully accept that the artistic community might classify
Kelley’s garden as a work of postmodern conceptual art.”).
180
Pollara, 344 F.3d at 269.
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based on elitist privileging of the fine arts,181 the very distinction
enshrined in VARA. In this respect, VARA refutes Bleistein; it
demands that courts privilege fine art above other visual
expression.
How do we reconcile these competing policies within
copyright law? By copyright standards, VARA is exclusionary.
But if VARA’s purpose is to privilege a higher order of objects, as
suggested in Merryman’s cultural evolution theory of moral
rights,182 then the statute is overinclusive and irrationally
dictated by medium and convention. As the category of “art” has
widened its embrace to forms of popular culture,183 what was
previously considered “kitsch”184 has expanded to include the
material species that once signified high art. Consider one art
critic’s review of a portrait of Bill and Melinda Gates, in a column
tellingly entitled, “Is This Art?”185 The painting reflects an
inveterate art form—portraiture—in a traditional medium, oil on
canvas. It would certainly meet the Seventh Circuit’s terse
definition of the “noun” painting. Yet critic Blake Gopnik cannot
imagine the work having a place in “any . . . serious art
institution”—not because of mediocre quality, but because the
portrait “isn’t functioning as art at all.”186
A court would easily read the Gates portrait as a “painting,”
and thus a work of art protectable under VARA. But reconciling
this hypothetical outcome with the exclusions imposed by the
First and Seventh Circuits is troubling. By sidelining the art
community in defining art under VARA, Kelley enforced a
doctrinal schism that frustrates the statute’s purpose. This is

181
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“A
picture is none the less a picture, and none the less a subject of copyright, that it is
used for an advertisement.”).
182
See generally supra note 70 and accompanying text.
183
See, e.g., United Feature Syndicate, Inc., v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing litigation based on artist Jeff Koons’s use of cartoon
character “Odie” as the premise for a sculpture).
184
See, e.g., CLEMENT GREENBERG, Avant-Garde and Kitsch, in ART AND
CULTURE: CRITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 70, at 3, 9–21.
185
Blake Gopnik, Is This Art?, DAILY BEAST (May 18, 2011, 12:22 PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/05/18/bill-and-melinda-gates-portrait-isthis-art.html.
186
Id. He compares the work to a driver’s license photograph. However, painting
as a form is not a reliable indicator of historical anachronism. Figurative painters
like John Currin and Lisa Yuskavage are highly valued in the contemporary art
world.
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not to suggest that courts have erred in their reasoning,187 but to
point out that in reaching these decisions, they simultaneously
construct and implement an artistic hierarchy that has
increasingly deviated from that of the community governed.188 In
other words, shouldn’t a statute whose goals include preserving
contemporary art be influenced by current artistic norms?
B.

The Cultural Object

Just as the concept of art resists definition, so does
“culture”;189 yet, the relationship between the two was made
critical to VARA’s preservation agenda. The vast role into which
Congress cast VARA’s narrow class of art objects included
“capturing the essence of culture and recording it for future
generations.”190 The objects preserved would convey “an accurate
account of the culture of our time,”191 testify to national
character, and stand “among the greatest of our national
treasures.”192
Conceptualizing VARA as a means of recording American
history and protecting national treasures, however, contains
several contestable assumptions, and this Article will mention a
187
The Seventh Circuit, for example, simply adhered to the plain meaning of the
statute in holding that a work protected under VARA must also be copyrightable.
While the reasoning by which the court judged the work unfit for copyright
protection is beyond the scope of this Article, restricting moral rights to
copyrightable works has not been viewed as particularly controversial. See, e.g.,
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Hoisting Originality: A Response, 20 DEPAUL J. ART TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 2 (2009) (“I do not believe the best approach is to apply moral
rights to a wider array of works than are currently covered under copyright law.”).
188
But see Brancusi v. United States, T.D. 43063, 54 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 428
(1928), where a Customs Court allowed Brancusi’s Bird in Flight to enter the United
States as “art,” and thus without a tariff. The court acknowledged that “under the
earlier decisions this importation would have been rejected as a work of art,” but
deferred to the art world’s embrace of modernism and stated: “Whether or not we are
in sympathy with these newer ideas and the schools which represent them, we think
the fact of their existence and their influence upon the art world as recognized by
the courts must be considered.” Id. at 430–31.
189
For discussions on culture as an analytic framework of which the law is
constitutive, rather than autonomous from, see generally Paul W. Kahn, Freedom,
Autonomy, and the Cultural Study of Law, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 141 (2001);
Menachem Mautner, Three Approaches to Law and Culture, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 839
(2011); Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35 (2001).
190
135 CONG. REC. 12,622 (daily ed. June 20, 1989) (statement of Rep. Markey).
191
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2690 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 125 (1990) (statement of Weltzin Blix).
192
Id. at 117 (statement of Arnold L. Lehman).
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few. First, it assumes that the class of objects defined under
VARA reflects contemporary art, and moreover great art—
connections that, as shown in the previous section, courts have
repudiated. Second, it assumes that contemporary art objects
embody American culture—an assumption that many would find
incongruous with the notion of an art world as a discrete, insular,
and sometimes elitist segment of this nation’s culture. Third, it
assumes that art preservation inures to the public good—an
assumption whose limitations and political mediations became
apparent in an array of historic clashes. This section deals with
the latter two assumptions, canvassing the conflicts precipitated
by a statute aimed at protecting American culture.
1.

Cultural Records and National Treasures
“There is truth in objects.”193

While VARA defines art in its text, its conception of culture
is more implicit. Under VARA, culture is reified, condensed into
a type of object—a philosophy that again strikes a musicological
chord and invokes cultural property theory. The notion of
recording American culture by protecting objects in their
“authentic” form, for the benefit of the public, sounds not unlike
the theme of a museum fundraiser, especially one offering an
encyclopedic unfolding of history.194 The quote from Merryman
about objects as truth posits “art” as inclusive of artifacts, a
vision of human culture reflected in art and archeological
museum collections, where objects are preserved as vestiges of
bygone civilizations.195
Under an object-based mode of
193

Merryman, The Public Interest, supra note 66, at 346.
Conservation has traditionally been viewed as one fundamental purpose of a
museum. The language below parallels themes in VARA’s legislative history:
“Cultural property consists of individual objects, structures, or aggregate collections.
It is material which has significance that may be artistic, historical, scientific,
religious, or social, and it is an invaluable and irreplaceable legacy that must be
preserved for future generations.” AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR CONSERVATION,
Preamble, CODE OF ETHICS AND GUIDELINES FOR PRACTICE 283 (1994), available at
http://www.conservation-us.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&PageID=858&
d:%5CCFusionMX7%5Cverity%5CData%5Cdummy.txt.
195
See Merryman, The Public Interest, supra note 66, at 346 (referring to work
produced by “the artist or artisan”). The practice of conserving cultural objects in
museums has been applied, much more controversially, to living cultures. See
generally 3 OBJECTS AND OTHERS: ESSAYS ON MUSEUMS AND MATERIAL CULTURE
(George W. Stocking, Jr. ed., 1985); EXHIBITING CULTURES: THE POETICS AND
POLITICS OF MUSEUM DISPLAY (Ivan Karp & Steven D. Lavine eds., 1991); JAMES
CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY,
194
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ascertaining knowledge about culture, the objects are isolated
repositories of a definite truth that can be discovered and
communicated to the viewer.196 For all its limitations, this
archeological approach encompasses manifold associations, e.g.,
ritual, religious, and functional, in addition to the Western
construct of high art rooted in eighteenth-century Europe.197
With VARA, the meaning of the objects identified is
prefigured; VARA thus informs and constitutes, rather than
discovers and reflects, a set of civic values. Moreover, its
selection presupposes the broad social relevance of “fine art,”
under which the exclusive function of the object is to be
preserved and admired for its aesthetic value. Under VARA,
preservation is not merely an outcome, but a prerequisite.198
In the cultural role invoked by legislators, VARA’s objects
are also national treasures because they reflect the highest
achievements of genius within a universal aesthetic norm—
modernism’s distinguishing feature. Moral rights scholars like
Merryman discuss great art as if it were the only kind, or at least
easily ascertainable and susceptible to definition by consensus.199
It is this notion of art as not merely an object, but an unspoken
discriminatory standard, that sustains the public interest
justification of the right to prohibit destruction,200 tacitly
reinforced in discourse that references the loss of works by

LITERATURE, AND ART (1988); SALLY PRICE, PRIMITIVE ART IN CIVILIZED PLACES
(1989).
196
See Ian Sutherland & Sophia Krzys Acord, Thinking with Art: From Situated
Knowledge to Experiential Knowing, 6 J. VISUAL ART PRAC. 125, 133 (2007)
(discussing the limitations of objects as sources of “objective” knowledge).
197
See generally MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET:
REREADING THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS (Jonathan Arac ed., 1994) (providing
history of modern conception of the arts).
198
The district court in Pollara demonstrated this circularity by requiring the
manifest intent that the object was created to be preserved, rather than used for
advertising, as a threshold. See Pollara v. Seymour, 206 F. Supp. 2d 333, 336–37
(N.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 344 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2003). According to the court, a contrary
result “would not advance the values protected by VARA.” Id. at 337 n.6.
199
A more utopian view suggests that all art should be preserved. See Liemer,
supra note 10, at 51 (arguing that right of integrity “avoids value judgments” as to
quality because a “society that recognizes this right recognizes the value of all
creative efforts”). Both rhetorical stances avoid uncomfortable line-drawing because
they frame the doctrine solely in terms of whether “art,” as an undifferentiated
category, is valued by society.
200
Id. at 52 (describing how unless destruction is prohibited, “[t]he public’s
interest in the work also goes unprotected”).
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renowned artists like Picasso. These views implicitly deny the
influence of culture in determining, as opposed to merely
reflecting, the winners.201
The “recognized stature” standard in the anti-destruction
provision is VARA’s proxy for national treasures, i.e., high
cultural value. Although recognized stature has been criticized
for obstructing a broader allocation of moral rights,202 the more
telling cultural exclusions occur earlier, in the objects that fail to
qualify for consideration: not just advertising, but popular forms
of entertainment like motion pictures and videographic
expression.203
Mass media and mass culture—emblematic
attributes of American identity—were excised from VARA’s
embrace, rendering high culture as the sole exponent of national
heritage. Ultimately, VARA does not necessarily protect artifacts
that signify or embody culture. Rather, it protects a class of
objects that fit a prescribed cultural role.

201
See, e.g., LINDA NOCHLIN, Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?, in
WOMEN, ART, AND POWER 145, 152–55 (1988) (pointing out latent cultural biases
that inhere in professional norms, including conception of “Great Artist”). Trends are
one indication of cultural influences. See, e.g., Storr, supra note 141, at 31 (noting
arc of burgeoning interest in Frieda Kahlo in 1930s, slump in 1950s and 60s, and
now exorbitant prices); Jeffrey Weiss, 9 Minutes 45 Seconds, in COLLECTING THE
NEW, supra note 140, at 41, 45 (acknowledging political incentives in National
Gallery’s efforts to collect Abstract Expressionism in the 1970s and 80s); Georgina
Adam, The Lure of the East, ART NEWSPAPER, Jan. 2011, at 31, 31 (noting recent
revival of interest in nineteenth-century Orientalism, following period of political
incorrectness).
202
See Robinson, supra note 8, at 1964, 1971 (proposing removal of recognized
stature requirement). Contrary to this theory, courts have shown some willingness
to apply the standard flexibly—a willingness that suggests a desire to translate the
idea of art into values that resonate with a broader theory of culture. E.g., Hanrahan
v. Ramirez, No. 2:97-CV-7470 RAP RC, 1998 WL 34369997, *4 (C.D. Cal. June 3,
1998) (finding mural painted by artist and 300 kids from economically depressed,
racially diverse area had recognized stature, and finding harm to the artist’s
reputation “as one who can make this kind of community project work”); Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing deference to “art
experts, the art community, or society in general”); cf. Robinson, supra note 8, at
1959–61 (noting frequency of litigation over murals valued in California Chicano
communities since VARA).
203
I refer to cultural products that have some visual component, and thus
exclude other copyrightable expressions arguably more associated with American
culture, like certain musical genres.
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The Politics of Preservation
“The integrity right helps preserve artworks intact for all of us
to enjoy.”204

This section probes the conflicting impulses that belie the
monolithic cultural role assigned by VARA to art objects, wherein
art preservation is always a public benefit and an overture of
social harmony.205
a.

The Imperfect Moment

As discussed, VARA’s taxonomy recalls modernism by
implying the object’s autonomous, self-contained aesthetic
existence. Professor Sax, arguing for greater regulation and
protection of cultural treasures, similarly views recognition of the
art object’s intrinsic aesthetic value critical to cultural
preservation policy because it supersedes the political or religious
purpose that might trigger the object’s iconoclastic demise.
According to Professor Sax, the aesthetic priority represents “the
great triumph of the decontextualization of art.”206
To illustrate, he relays an incident from the 1930s, when the
Rockefellers discovered that Diego Rivera’s mural, commissioned
for an entranceway in Rockefeller Center, included a portrait of
Lenin. To their request that he paint over Lenin’s face, Rivera
responded that he would prefer destruction of the work in its
entirety. The Rockefellers, after paying Rivera in full, had the
mural destroyed, an act which Rivera called “cultural
vandalism.” According to Professor Sax, “The Rockefellers can
only be seen as ‘cultural vandals’ if the community’s interest in
preserving the achievements of genius is understood to be more

204
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2690 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 82 (1990) (statement of Prof. Jane Ginsburg).
205
See, e.g., Liemer, supra note 10, at 56–57 (“Experiencing others’ art gives a
greater sense of the other and often facilitates an understanding of and sensitivity to
those who view the world differently.”); Ong, supra note 9, at 309 (“[T]he
communicative function that the integrity right serves towards the cultivation of a
tolerant, respectful and culturally enlightened community.”).
206
SAX, supra note 56, at 18. Justin Hughes assumes the modernist approach by
suggesting that western art has been characterized by a progression toward
decontextualization, beginning with context-dependent religious art and leading to
modern art, film, and the internet. Hughes, supra note 114, at 25 (“All of these social
and artistic developments have given rise to a popular belief that a work, by itself,
embodies meaning.”).
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important than its role in advancing the political or religious
agenda of the owner or patron.”207 That, he says, is the position
taken by “the modern world.”208
It is probably fairer to state that modern America has taken
this position with historical hindsight.209 Although certainly the
destruction of Rivera’s mural was tragic, Professor Sax’s view is
facilitated by the neutralizing power of historical distance, both
in terms of a changed political environment and retrospective
consensus as to Rivera’s contribution to art history.210 Important
interests, including those implied by Rivera’s reaction, seem
compromised by a theory that renders the Rockefellers
insufficiently appreciative of the object’s aesthetic value.211
The impossibility of filtering contemporaneous associations,
of somehow placing one’s vantage outside of history to appreciate
an object’s “inherent” aesthetic attributes is exemplified in the
culture wars of the 1990s, precipitated by the Corcoran Gallery’s
cancellation of an exhibition of Robert Mapplethorpe’s homoerotic
photographs.212 In the context of the visual arts, the culture wars
also demonstrated that like objects, acts of destruction have an
expressive value.213 Just one month prior to Representative
Markey’s pronouncement that works by American artists should
be preserved because they capture and record “the essence of
culture.”214 Senator Alphonse D’Amato famously tore up a copy
207

SAX, supra note 56, at 17–18.
Id. at 18.
209
Some would argue that this view has also justified a colonialist approach to
non-Western property because it denies meanings invested by the source culture.
See Patricia Failing, The Case of Dismembered Masterpieces, ARTNEWS, Sept. 1980,
at 68 (noting that practice of breaking up and decontextualizing objects is often
associated with the importation of cultural artifacts from Third World countries).
210
As Professor Mezey has observed with respect to the broader realm of
cultural property, “[p]reservationism, for all its importance, values stasis, and
therefore is much better suited to dead cultures than to living ones.” Mezey, supra
note 62, at 2013.
211
Prior to having the mural destroyed, Nelson Rockefeller attempted to donate
it to the Museum of Modern Art, but this plan was rejected by the museum’s
trustees. See SAX, supra note 56, at 14–15.
212
The Corcoran Gallery had agreed to host an exhibition of the artist’s
photographs, The Perfect Moment. Upon learning that the exhibition included
explicit, homoerotic works, and two images of naked children, it canceled. The
Washington Project for the Arts ultimately displayed the images, to huge crowds,
from July 21 to August 18, 1989.
213
For an interesting discussion on the expressive value of destruction, see Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right To Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 824–30 (2005).
214
135 CONG. REC. E2227 (daily ed. June 20, 1989) (statement of Rep. Markey).
208
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of Andres Serrano’s controversial work, Piss Christ, on the floor
of the Senate.215 D’Amato’s gesture offers a potent countersymbolism to the Trois Femmes incident. Moreover, the former—
targeting work by an American artist—is arguably more
representative of our national culture in the 1990s, one
characterized by dissent and discomfort with a diverse cultural
landscape. The juxtaposition of VARA’s enactment with this
milieu reveals a more oppositional stance with culture than
anticipated.
b.

The Democracy of Destruction
“This is a day for the people to rejoice, because now the plaza
returns rightfully to the people.”216

An art object need not manifest a socially divisive message
for art preservation to assume a political character. This is
partly because contemporary art is not just another category of
American artifacts, alongside historical monuments like the
Liberty Bell; it is a league often perceived as un-American and
elitist. While museums have long contended with the gap
between contemporary art and a broad public audience,217
VARA’s public is involuntary.
Although it has been repeatedly dissected in law and art
historical literature, the highly publicized, pre-VARA controversy
in 1986, involving Richard Serra and his seventy-three-ton steel
“anti-monument,” Tilted Arc, remains a compelling illustration of
the intense hostility that can mount over a public art work
absent overt political content. It depicts the more extreme ends

215
D’Amato’s conduct occurred on May 18, 1989. 135 CONG. REC. S5594 (daily
ed. May 18, 1989) (statement of Sen. D’Amato); Andres Serrano: Piss Christ,
CHRISTIE’S AUCTION HOUSE, http://www.christies.com/LotFinder/lot_details.aspx?int
ObjectID=5070403 (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
216
William Diamond, regional administrator of the federal government’s Art-inArchitecture Program, speaking on the day that Richard Serra’s commissioned
abstract sculpture, Tilted Arc, was removed from New York’s Federal Plaza.
Maquette for Titled Arc, SMITHSONIAN AMERICAN ART MUSEUM AND THE RENWICK
GALLERY,
http://americanart.si.edu/collections/search/artwork/?id=22145
(last
visited Oct. 10, 2013).
217
See generally Carl Andre et al., The Role of the Artist in Today’s Society, 34
ART J. 327 (1975) (discussing museum symposium addressing gap between art and
public). Modern museum audiences in the United States typically consist of persons
with high levels of formal education. Kreidler, supra note 39, at 157 (“This point has
been confirmed by virtually all surveys of performing arts and museum audiences
over the past three decades.”).
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of how a seemingly neutral, literally conservative, decision to
preserve can ignite latent tensions between the artistic
community and the public.
In brief, Serra had been commissioned by the General
Services Administration (“GSA”) of the federal government to
design a sculpture under its Art-in-Architecture program.218
Serra’s massive, site-specific arc219 was installed at the center of
Federal Plaza and greeted with immediate hostility by employees
who demanded its removal.220 When GSA offered to move the
work to a new venue, Serra claimed that relocation was
tantamount to destruction and brought suit.221
Spectators
described the hearings as an intensely antagonistic confrontation
between an elitist art world and “the people.”222 In the end,
Tilted Arc was destroyed.
Although the quote above indicates that “the people” won,
Tilted Arc, like most public sculpture, was defended on grounds
of democracy and public access.223 Which public represents
American culture, when, and for how long? The final irony of
Tilted Arc is that although it was destroyed decades ago, we still

218
For a detailed discussion of GSA’s Art-in-Architecture program—whose
policy rationale was exclusively aesthetic enrichment—and comparison with other
federal arts programs, see Judith Huggins Balfe, The Process of Commissioning
Public Sculpture: “Due” or “Duel”, in AMERICA’S COMMITMENT TO CULTURE:
GOVERNMENT AND THE ARTS, supra note 44, at 189, 189–204.
219
Unlike site-specific art that attempted to complement its environment,
Serra’s arc reflected his ambition that the site “be understood primarily as a
function of the sculpture.” Thomas Crow, Site-Specific Art: The Strong and the Weak,
in MODERN ART IN THE COMMON CULTURE 131, 146 (1996) (quoting Richard Serra).
220
See Robert Storr, “Tilted Arc”: Enemy of the People?, ART IN AMERICA, Sept.
1980, at 91, 91–92.
221
Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 667 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
aff’d, 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988).
222
See Crow, supra note 219, at 148–50; cf. Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin.,
847 F.2d 1045, 1047 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[Tilted Arc] is now coated with what the artist
refers to as ‘a golden amber patina’ and what the sculpture's critics refer to as
‘rust.’ ”).
223
The dismemberment of art has likewise been defended on grounds of cultural
democracy, at least with respect to non-Western art. See, e.g., Michael Kimmelman,
Who Draws the Borders of Culture?, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at AR1 (arguing that
the “countless altars and other works of art [that] have been split up and dispersed
among private collectors and museums here and there” has been “democratizing”).
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talk about it, in law and in art history. Tilted Arc, probably
Serra’s best known sculpture, derived monumental, enduring
power from and in its absence.224
The examples provided ultimately speak neither for the
public benefit of preservation nor that of destruction. Rather,
they signify the mutability and variance of symbolism associated
with art objects, and they highlight that the modern approach to
preservation implicit in VARA is not simply a means of
protecting culture but a distinct cultural value in itself.
C.

The Transcendent Object
“I wish I was a hedge fund manager. Or at least I wish I knew
what hedge fund managers do.”225
“They collect art.”226

This section looks at the consequences of investing an object
with transcendence, that is, valuing it as something other than a
commodity, as theorized under VARA’s right of integrity. Under
VARA, the anti-commodity status of art is intimately connected
to the Romantic author archetype and the creative act.227 But the
transcendent object is also a social role with remarkable traction:
Objects may be deemed “priceless” or universalized as belonging
to no one,228 even though we know that works sell at auction and
have owners. This section examines the implications of these
conflicting meanings for the moral rights doctrine and for its
relation to copyright law and considers how destruction fits into
this picture.

224
See Crow, supra note 219, at 150 (arguing that Tilted Arc controversy, as
opposed to the object, instigated important debates that “might have been
complacently put aside had it gone on existing.”).
225
GEOFF DYER, JEFF IN VENICE, DEATH IN VARANASI 89 (2009).
226
Id.
227
Moral rights theory suggests that the object is almost a living thing, like a
child. KWALL, supra note 7, at 13 (discussing parental metaphor as reflecting
intrinsic dimension of creativity); Adler, supra note 10, at 269; see also Deborah
Solomon, Our Most Notorious Sculptor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1989, § 6, at 39
(reporting that Serra and his wife speak of Tilted Arc “as if it were a child they
lost”).
228
See 133 CONG. REC. E4257 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1987) (statement of Rep.
Markey) (“[Works of art] belong to no one because they belong to all of us.”).
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The Moral of Creation

To justify incorporating moral rights into the Copyright Act,
VARA’s supporters rendered art preservation utilitarian. They
suggested that the climate of respect and honor created by
preserving contemporary art would motivate further creation,
analogous to, yet qualitatively distinct from, the economic reward
presumably inspiring other types of authors.229 This theory relies
on two false binaries: (1) art versus money and (2) preservation
versus destruction.
a.

Incentives and Requirements

In the destruction paradigm based on Picasso’s Trois
Femmes, the profit-motivated entrepreneur is the bad guy.230
This seems a remarkable nemesis, especially in the late 1980s.231
Art has been connected to a market ever since formal patronage
declined and the dealer system emerged in the nineteenth
century. Although this Article shares the opinion that artists are
not motivated by profits,232 they have long been compelled to
navigate the mundane business of selling their works. Indeed,
the waning reliability of secure commissions and the absence of a
socially integrated role helped create the conditions that resulted
in the Romantic author, starving and alone, opposed to banal

229
See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text (discussing utilitarian
justification for moral rights advanced by legislators). This logic has been
perpetuated by courts and commentators alike. See, e.g., Mass. Museum of
Contemporary Art Found., Inc., v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 49 (1st Cir. 2010)
(acknowledging one purpose of VARA was to “encourage the creation of . . . [fine]
art”); Liemer, supra note 10, at 44 (“Recognizing moral rights is one way a society
can encourage artists to create.”).
230
See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
231
See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. E4257 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1987) (statement of Rep.
Markey) (“[A]rt . . . is more than a piece of property . . . . [I]t is even more than a
valuable commodity with one of the highest rates of return on the market. Works of
art are much more than that.”).
232
KWALL, supra note 7, at 19 (“[C]reativity is spurred largely by incentives that
are noneconomic in nature.”). See generally Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in
Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151 (2007) (critiquing both rights-based
and economic approaches to copyright law as impoverished means of theorizing
creativity); Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace
Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2009) (critiquing theory of external
incentives to creativity).

FINAL_BONNEAU

2013]

12/11/2013 3:26 PM

CONFLICTED OBJECT IN MORAL RIGHTS LAW

95

social conventions.233 Although the paradoxical dependency of
art upon money is everywhere observed, this oppositional trope
persists.234
VARA both denies the economic side of art and attempts to
redress it.
Although moral rights are presented as
nonpecuniary235 and often discussed in quasi-spiritual terms,
VARA is also rationalized as a means for visual artists to
increase bargaining power over purchasers236 and offers money
damages.237 Recall that the VARA bill was partly defended as a
means for visual artists—meaning creators of unique objects—to
obtain parity with other authors better served under the
copyright model.238 But as a statute that purports to provide only
noneconomic rights, VARA clashes with, rather than
supplements, the dominant culture of copyright law. Although
copyright law has been criticized for overrelying on economic
theory,239 the reverse polarization of art and money has also
frustrated the marriage of moral rights with copyright law;
instead, VARA assumes the somewhat absurd stance of
purporting to incentivize transcendence.
As much as the Picasso paradigm appears to chastise the
destructive taint of money, its subtext honors the economic value
of art. To wit, the Trois Femmes example is effectively devoid of
an artist; its outrageousness is derived from the loss of an object
highly valued by the market—due to the artist’s reputation—not

233

See JANET WOLFF, THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF ART 10–12 (2d ed. 1993).
See, e.g., David Colman, Rachel Feinstein and John Currin, Their Own Best
Creations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, ST1 (discussing potential harm to reputation
and credibility when artists lead relatively glamorous lifestyles).
235
See Yu, supra note 77, at 20 (“[T]he protection of moral rights is not about
pecuniary compensation.”); Ong, supra note 9, at 312 (critiquing economic
justifications of moral rights as counterproductive).
236
E.g., KWALL, supra note 7, at 33 (altering the bargaining power between
author and user is “the very purpose of moral rights laws”); Ong, supra note 9, at
302.
237
See, e.g., Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 1999)
(noting the court’s reluctance to impose full statutory damages despite violation,
reasoning that destructive conduct could not have been “wilful,” under
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) because defendant had no knowledge of VARA rights).
238
See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 22, at 100 (arguing on economic
grounds that copyright law already functions like a right of integrity with respect to
literary works).
239
See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 232, at 517–18 (“What empirical evidence
exists does not engender confidence that increases in copyright protection spur
creativity.”).
234
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the artist’s diminished dignity.
VARA plaintiffs seek art
preservation based on the latter, but without the former, the task
is more arduous.
b.

Preservationism and Destructionism

Contrary to the model offered by legislators, in which
preservation begets creation, Amy Adler has argued that VARA
is harmful to artists because it is based on an outdated
conception of art that “artists have been rebelling against for the
last forty years.”240 Preservation, she argues, thwarts destruction
and thereby stifles creation: “Inherent in the idea of the avantgarde, valorized by modernism, is the idea of continually
breaking with the past. Modernism depended on shattering
tradition; the progress of art entailed a kind of metaphorical
iconoclasm.”241
Because she views destruction as essential to artistic
progress, Professor Adler contends that “moral rights laws
endanger art in the name of protecting it.”242
One example of the many that Professor Adler uses to
demonstrate the importance of destruction to creative innovation
is Erased de Kooning Drawing, from 1953—Rauschenberg’s
celebrated attack by erasure on a work by the eponymous thenreigning master of painting and quintessential Abstract
Expressionist.243
In the view of many, the unknown
Rauschenberg destroyed de Kooning’s art to advance from the
oppressive hegemony of Abstract Expressionism. Adler positions
Erased de Kooning as a “scandalous assault on a particular
conception of ‘art,’ ” the one embodied in VARA.244
In one respect it was, but this Article offers the obvious
corollary. Erased de Kooning now hangs in the San Francisco
Museum of Modern Art and is revered as the very conception of
“art” that it arguably decimated.
Without discrediting
Rauschenberg’s personal convictions or the work’s performative
impact,245 the absorption of the work and the artist into the
240

Adler, supra note 10.
Id. at 265, 288.
242
Id. at 265.
243
Id. at 283. Significantly, de Kooning willingly provided the drawing for this
event. Id. at 283 n.111.
244
Id. at 283.
245
Erased de Kooning, while not unimportant, did not single-handedly
devastate Abstract Expressionism; as with most art historical developments, the
241
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established canon bespeaks a cycle rather than an end.
Rauschenberg may have destroyed de Kooning’s sovereignty, but
not the kingdom.246
Rauschenberg is not the only artist to take a counter-cultural
stance, only to be venerated by the cultural mainstream.247
While today’s conceptual impulse can be traced to Duchamp, he
began signing his readymades in the 1960s, acceding to the
institutional values of rarity, authorship, and authenticity that
his readymades supposedly mocked.
Defiance of the art
establishment often generates a notoriety that ultimately
reaffirms the attacked domain.248 Thus, even as he exposed the
“white cube,” Duchamp also demonstrated its capacity to absorb
assault.249 Even today’s artists who work in the conceptual
tradition of Duchamp are doing just that: perpetuating the
oxymoron of an “avant garde tradition.” In sum, rather than
being incompatible with the Romantic author, the artistdestroyer epitomizes it.

process eludes definitive boundaries. See, e.g., CROW, supra note 148, at 18–19
(discussing significance of Jasper Johns’s 1958 exhibition). See generally JOSHUA
SHANNON, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF OBJECTS: NEW YORK ART AND THE RISE OF THE
POSTMODERN CITY (2009) (characterizing both Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns as
late modernists, rather than incipient postmodernists).
246
A similar paradox has been ascribed to Andy Warhol; Warhol, often credited
with ending “art,” devoted his life to making “art.” See Louis Menand, Top of the
Pops, NEW YORKER, Jan. 11, 2010, at 57, 63. In addition, Rauschenberg does not
easily serve as the exemplar of creative destruction. See Bd. of Managers of Soho
Int’l Arts Condo. v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 1226 DAB, 2003 WL 21403333, at
*6 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003) (listing Rauschenberg among artists seeking to
preserve Soho artwork by another artist). Rauschenberg also had a moral rights
action pending at the time of his death, based on attribution rights.
247
Adler, supra note 10, at 283 (noting that Abstract Expressionism, initially
the avant-garde, was effectively institutionalized as the prevailing art form at the
time of Rauschenberg’s Erased de Kooning).
248
See, e.g., Colman, supra note 234 (explaining that contemporary art star
John Currin became noticed in the 1990s with a show consisting of racy depictions of
middle-aged, upper-middle-class women and a Village Voice review by Kim Levin
imploring readers to boycott it); Calvin Tomkins, Lifting the Veil, NEW YORKER, Jan.
28, 2008, at 58, 62–63 (quoting Currin, “thank God there was that really bad review
in the Village Voice . . . which got me some attention.”). Earlier examples abound.
See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 227 (describing Richard Serra as “risen from the ranks
of the 1960’s avant-garde into the annals of art history”); see also Symposium, The
Role of the Artist in Today’s Society, 34 ART J. 327, 329 (1975) (“[T]he easiest way to
get into the art system is to appear to be working outside it or against it.”).
249
See, e.g., Julia Bryan-Wilson, Sounding the Fury, ARTFORUM, Jan. 2008, at
95, 95 (noting that Dan Graham’s property-resistant dematerialized conceptual art
“has proved no escape from the rapaciousness of the market”).
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Modernist destruction was primarily metaphorical, whereas
postmodernism made it real. Professor Adler does not draw a
hard line between the two,250 but the difference is crucial because
VARA only interferes with the latter.251 To oppose moral rights
on grounds that the doctrine stifles creativity implies that the
literal destruction of single-copy, original works by one’s living
contemporaries is a necessary condition of innovation or superior
mode of artistic practice—a theory which, if true, seems
creatively stalled.252 The theory also appears dissociated from
the prevailing artistic practice of appropriating widely-available
copies, rather than original works of art. Nor does creative
destruction account for VARA case law, which suggests a less
interesting yet still relevant truth: that sometimes destruction is
just destruction.253 Perhaps the locked horns of the destructionpreservation binary, like that of art-money, is too reductionist.
Rather, both impulses inform the practices and conceptualization
of art, and neither one alone can sustain a coherent thesis of
cultural progress, a dynamic process in which traditions are
continually reenacted, broken, created, and reinterpreted.
2.

The Vanishing Point

Perhaps the least anticipated yet most critical challenge
posed by VARA’s anti-destruction provision is its inability to
account for cultural obsolescence. That is, an essential premise
of the Trois Femmes example, likewise apparent in Buffet’s

250
Picasso, for example, whom Adler quotes as saying, “A picture is a sum of its
destructions,” Adler, supra note 10, at 263, arguably annihilated traditional artistic
practices, but he did not literally destroy the works of his peers—aside from Erased
de Kooning, neither did Rauschenberg. Indeed, Picasso personifies the author-genius
construct that many postmodern artists have challenged.
251
Moral rights law flourished in turn-of-the-century France, concurrently with
its avant-garde modernism. The impressionist Camille Pissarro, for example, spoke
of “ ‘burn[ing] down the Louvre’ ” in defiance of all artistic tradition. LINDA
NOCHLIN, THE POLITICS OF VISION: ESSAYS ON NINETEENTH-CENTURY ART AND
SOCIETY 62 (1st ed. 1989). Destruction as an artistic theme remains compatible with
museum culture; for example, the Damage Control: Art and Destruction Since 1950
Exhibit at Hirshorn Museum on display until May 26, 2014.
252
Professor Adler acknowledges this conflict, writing, “I am wary of blithely
etching in stone a vision of art, reflecting the current moment, that is doomed to
become just as outmoded as the romantic concepts underlying moral rights.” Adler,
supra note 10, at 299.
253
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 133–135 (explaining that Büchel’s
bid to the court for destruction, for example, was not in the name of artistic
creation).
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refrigerator case, is commercial demand for the artwork in its
exploited form. Even in the Erased de Kooning example, as its
title indicates, a continued association with de Kooning is central
to the work’s meaning. Erased de Kooning appears to suggest an
alternate view of destruction than the Picasso paradigm, i.e.,
destruction as creation, but the paradigms are analogously
contingent on the legible presence of iconic artists, albeit for
differing purposes. These “destroyed” works effectively preserve
and depend upon the inviolability of the original artist’s
reputation, still cognizable and carried into the new creation.
They are both annihilation and homage.
The anti-destruction case law offers the reverse: Instead of
saving highly valued art from commercial exploitation, artists
have invoked VARA to either compel value or redress inadequate
value. Specifically, in a typical VARA case, the owners want to
destroy, abandon, or rid themselves of the work, not profit from
the resale or redesign of smaller components. In Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, for example, the new owners of the building
containing plaintiffs’ installation simply wanted it gone.254 In
Martin v. City of Indianapolis, the City demolished the plaintiff’s
twenty-by-forty foot outdoor metal sculpture; there was no resale
attempt.255 In Pollara v. Seymour, the painted banner was
crumpled, torn, and discarded by city employees.256
Accordingly, examples such as Buffet’s refrigerator and
Erased de Kooning bear little resemblance to VARA’s litigation
history, where a court usually must decide whether a property
owner should be compelled to preserve intact a work by a lesserknown artist with no ulterior use to the owner—including selling
the work—and which may impinge on other uses of the property
it inhabits. Notably, with the exception of Büchel, which was
atypical in that the VARA defendant was a museum, even the
mutilation cases have typically not involved either creative or
commercial exploitation.257 Rather, VARA integrity cases are
254

Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995).
Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 611 (7th Cir. 1999).
256
Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 2003).
257
Perhaps because there is no definitive test for distinguishing destruction
from mutilation, it is difficult to identify a consistent rationale for the plaintiff’s
choice of theory. In Kelley, the artist sued under the mutilation provision only,
though presumably he could have likewise pleaded the case as destruction. See
Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 295 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
380 (2011). The artist may also bring suit under both the mutilation and destruction
255
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sustained by works mutilated or destroyed because of their
perceived lack of exploitability. They are all annihilation, no
homage.
Some scholars have suggested that a principal reason for
limiting moral rights to works of fine art is that these objects are
typically acquired for their aesthetic rather than utilitarian value
and thus are less likely to require modification to perform their
function.258 That may be true, but this theory splinters as
applied to the anti-destruction provision, which invites litigation
on a highly likely outcome of purchasing art for aesthetic value:
that taste will change, such that the objects no longer have a
function to perform at all. As Dario Gamboni points out,
speaking more generally about cultural artifacts, “it is their
normal fate to disappear.”259 VARA is thus available as a protest
of accelerated obsolescence.260 Moreover, as individual specimens
of an art preservation mandate, VARA disputes are always a
worst-case scenario in that only works undesired by their owners
are adjudicated for privileged status.261

provisions. See Pollara, 344 F.3d at 269. One pre-VARA mutilation example
frequently cited in moral rights literature involved a large mobile by the sculptor
Alexander Calder, donated to the Pittsburgh airport. The airport had the mobile
repainted in green and gold (the colors of Allegheny County) and soldered parts to
prevent motion. Calder sought to have the work restored to its original state in the
latter two decades of his life, but was unsuccessful. Two years after his death in
1976, however, the airport agreed to restore the sculpture. See Hansmann &
Santilli, supra note 22, at 100. At the time Calder fought his battle, he did not own
the copyright due to the “Pushman doctrine,” by which copyright was presumptively
transferred with the physical object, a doctrine in effect until the 1976 Copyright
Act. Id. at 115. Hansmann and Santilli suggest that had Calder retained the
copyright, he could theoretically have argued that the airport’s reconfiguration and
repainting of the sculpture was a derivative work; however, case law of this nature
is undeveloped. See id. But see Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting derivative work argument as a potential “back door” to “an extraordinarily
broad version of authors’ moral rights”).
258
KWALL, supra note 7, at 69; Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 22, at 103–04.
259
DARIO GAMBONI, THE DESTRUCTION OF ART: ICONOCLASM AND VANDALISM
SINCE THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 25 (2007).
260
In other words, artists have invoked VARA on strictly preservationist
grounds, rather than for the traditional moral rights harm of misrepresenting the
artist’s vision. Professor Sax noted a similar trend under the California statute. SAX,
supra note 56, at 26–32 (remarking that the law was invoked “in almost every
instance to protect works against destruction”).
261
See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 22, at 111 (noting that anti-destruction
provision will almost always be invoked when a work is not highly valued, “since
rarely would the owner of a work of ‘recognized stature’ have an incentive to destroy
it”).
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This potential rupture between artist and public preference
sharply contrasts copyright’s utilitarian model, where consumer
demand determines copyright value. A novelist, musician, or
filmmaker may produce a great work that lacks an audience, but
copyright law offers nothing to keep the unpopular in circulation;
copyright law controls rights to, rather than helps create, the
work’s public value.262 Because it defines art yet lacks correlation
with use, VARA’s anti-destruction provision upends the copyright
progress model and denies its own cultural context.
IV. RECONFIGURATION: A POST-OBJECT PROPOSITION
VARA is a flawed moral rights statute, but the fix is not
simply to expand its reach; rather, American moral rights law
needs to be reconceptualized at its foundations. That the author,
rather than the physical object, should be the primary focus of
moral rights law is self-evident. Yet, as demonstrated, that
priority does not reflect the development of moral rights in
American scholarship; it was not the dominant rationale for
enacting VARA; it is not evidenced in the definitions, exclusions,
and operative provisions of VARA; and despite the boilerplate
rhetoric dispensed by courts, it does not reflect their concerns.
Instead, the goal of identifying and preserving unique objects of
art eclipsed the author and confounded the doctrine.
Moral rights theory cannot exclusively reside in a narrow
class of physical objects to make sense as copyright law, as rights
of personality, or as arts policy. As moral rights law, VARA’s
inclusion of an anti-destruction provision was technically
expansive, even compared to civil law jurisdictions. However,
underwriting moral rights with a social policy tied to art
preservation has exacted a high tax on authorship concerns,
while obscuring important but distinct issues of copyright

262
I do not suggest that the copyright reward system is normatively ideal, but
only that it provides a direct means of quantifying social value. Notably, this
problem would not necessarily arise in a law prohibiting the modification of
reproducible media, because demand inheres in the violation. See, e.g., Preminger v.
Columbia Pictures Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 363, 366, 372, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594, 599, 603 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1966), aff’d, 25 A.D.2d 830, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep’t), aff’d, 18
N.Y.2d 659, 219 N.E.2d 431, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80; supra note 128 and accompanying
text.
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protection for visual artists. The focus on objects also misses the
mark in the art community, establishing an autonomous
hierarchy that renders VARA both under- and over-inclusive.
We need to elucidate the goals of moral rights beyond the
preservation of tangible artifacts. Doing so requires, initially,
segregating the issue of “artists’ rights,” which as a synonym for
moral rights has proven detrimental to visual artists while shortcircuiting the doctrine’s reach to other authors. Visual artists
currently appear privileged, dissembling how stringently the
statute is implemented in accordance with its archaic taxonomy.
Moreover, framing the moral rights doctrine as a set of
“privileges” or “special rights,” as has been facilitated by isolating
a particular type of creator, undermines its legitimacy.263 If
creators of unique objects are ill-served under copyright law,
these concerns should be addressed as copyright law. Moral
rights should be addressed as a matter of authorship. It is only
from a well-defined foundation of authorial dignity as a
legitimate copyright interest that moral rights can gain traction
in the law and resist marginalization as a niche issue. From this
point, legislators could fashion rights appropriate to the needs of
different creators.
This foundation would require flexibility, attuned to
contemporary theories of creativity and culture. Moral rights
discourse has been so colonized with overblown, antiquated
imagery of the Romantic author that the entire doctrine is easy
to dismiss as sentimental, utopian, and obsolete. But neither the
caricatured Romantic nor Modernist roots of moral rights should
be grounds for dismissing the doctrine altogether, any more than
they provide a reason for completely abandoning copyright law.
Instead, the moral rights doctrine should be narrow, recast in
contemporary rhetoric and theory that focuses on creative
participation, authorial voice, and personal dignity, rather than
transcendence, genius, and preservation of cultural treasures.
Abandoning an object-based justification for moral rights
would be consistent with the pervasive use of the internet and
digital media in creative expression and the concomitant
proliferation of image appropriation. In this vein, several
scholars have advanced proposals for moral rights regimes that

263
I thank Professor Kwall for pointing out that the language of privilege
generally skews the discussion.
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favor a more widely-applicable right of attribution, requiring
accurate designation or disclaimers264 and specifically utilizing
digital tools such as hyperlinks to unaltered copies, citations, or
other embedded information.265 Attribution rights conceived in
these terms encompass goals traditionally served by the integrity
right, that is, protecting authors from their public association
with modified works that may be prejudicial to their dignity and
reputation.266 A moral rights law with this type of structure
could be circumscribed more by remedy than by a rigid taxonomy
at the front end, thereby maintaining copyright’s emphasis on
users’ rights and ensuring consistency with First Amendment
principles.267
This Article favors abolishing a distinct right against
destruction for those who create unique, tangible objects of art,
except in rare, carefully-defined circumstances. Specifically,
rather than cultural preservation’s presumption of serving the
public interest, the integrity right should depend on use268 of the
work, as is already implied by modification. Thus, a privatelyowned work could be freely discarded as unwanted—absented
from the cultural marketplace without public notice—no matter
how personally offended the artist might feel upon discovery.
But if the act or fact of destruction was intentionally exploited in
a public manner, the artist’s moral rights could be invoked.269
Under this model, a living artist’s integrity right would be
implicated if her work was dismembered and sold in pieces—the
act, rather than the work’s material form or quality, evidencing a
264

See KWALL, supra note 7, at 149–55.
See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Moral Rights and Supernatural Fiction: Authorial
Dignity and the New Moral Rights Agendas, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 537, 562–77 (2011) (discussing attribution models proposed by Professor
Kwall, as well as Professors Neil Weinstock Netanel and Jessica Litman).
266
KWALL, supra note 7, at 152–53 (proposing reform that requires link between
attribution and integrity violations).
267
A deeper discussion of the relationship between moral rights and First
Amendment law is beyond the scope of this Article; my analysis has assumed
constitutional consistency.
268
I define “use” broadly to include reproduction; display by any means,
including electronic transmission; commercial sale; exhibition, etc.
269
I am aware that an exploitation-based approach requires measuring moral
rights violations through extrinsic means, contrary to the view that moral rights
should presumptively encompass the subjective impact of destruction. See KWALL,
supra note 7, at 156 (proposing that prohibition of destruction of works be retained
for original versions of works of visual art on grounds that authorial dignity is
necessarily harmed when an artist’s work is destroyed).
265
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societal use in which the artist retains a dignity interest.270
Although exploitive use, as opposed to other proxies of cultural
value, will not necessarily protect what subsequent generations
determine to be the “best” work of its time, the lesson of VARA is
that cultural preservation policy should not be dispensed through
copyright law, whether in real or symbolic terms.271
Ultimately, neither the Picasso nor de Kooning situations
prove to be sound models for crafting contemporary moral rights
laws, given the case law predicated on an entirely different
paradigm.272 Rather, cultural norms in creative expression point
to a more urgent battle, currently being waged in the copyright
arena, over the line between theft and creative reuse of available
copies, not unique objects.273 While VARA is irrelevant to these
disputes, moral rights theory could be useful to copyright’s
appropriation wars. As copyright law responds to recycle and
remix culture, attribution and integrity rights offer a conceptual
means of addressing, rather than stifling, creative appropriation
of available imagery.274 In this way, moral rights theory could

270
Similarly, de Kooning, had he objected to Rauschenberg’s exhibited piece,
could theoretically assert a moral rights violation, except that the Erased de Kooning
situation was mitigated by proper attribution and an explanation of the change, by
means of the title.
271
The case of public art potentially challenges the “exploitive destruction”
standard, given that destruction would, at least arguably, inherently constitute a
public act. However, public art might be excepted as inherently noncommercial.
Alternatively, the work’s use value as art could comprehend the views of the
community rather than exclusively the owner.
272
As discussed, most VARA integrity cases have arisen against owners with
commercial objectives related to property impinged upon, not against other artists or
art collectors. But cf. Lilley v. Stout, 384 F. Supp. 2d 83, 84 (D.D.C. 2005). In Lilley,
a photographer sued an artist for incorporating his work without attribution. The
case was resolved in favor of the defendant because the court determined that the
plaintiff’s photographs were not produced for exhibition purposes only and therefore
did not meet VARA’s definition of a work of art. Id. at 88–89.
273
Unlike in the de Kooning example, where the original artist’s notoriety was
crucial to the new work, appropriation cases have involved a more successful artist
using an image by a lesser-known artist. E.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246–
47 (2d Cir. 2006); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 303–04 (2d Cir. 1992); Cariou v.
Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d in part and vacated in part,
714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Peter Jaszi, Is There Such a Thing as
Postmodern Copyright?, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 105, 106 (2009)
(discussing the impact of “postmodern cultural attitude” on copyright law).
274
A recent news article on Cariou v. Prince and its impact on artists and
copyright law quoted Virginia Rutledge on society’s “cultural attribution crisis,”
supporting greater acknowledgment and credit to source artists. Randy Kennedy,
Apropos Appropriation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2012, at AR1.
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help renovate copyright law by injecting authorial dignity as a
mediating factor rather than an additional, autonomous right.
Although the nexus of copyright law and creative production
resists any perfect utilitarian “solution,” the only way for moral
rights law to engage the conversation is by reconfiguring its
object.
CONCLUSION
VARA is perceived as a moral rights statute whose province
is exclusively visual artists, but its principal justification lies in
preserving unique objects of fine art as a form of American
cultural heritage. Rather than augmenting the authorship
interests of artists and the cultural enrichment of the public,
VARA’s dual purposes reified a conflict. Copyright law is not an
effective means of enforcing a policy of art preservation, and
channeling the latter through the former has profoundly limited
the moral rights doctrine in the United States, in theory and in
practice.
Moral rights should be reconceived as rights of
authorial dignity, rather than rights derived from the protection
of unique objects. Consistent with this premise, an antidestruction right of integrity for the creator of a unique object of
art should not lie except in the rare instance of exploitive
destruction by the owner. This would avoid compensating artists
for cultural changes or disuse and thereby help legitimate and
facilitate the development of other moral rights.

